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ABSTRACT 
This paper outlines how the Employment Relations Act 2000 enabled the New 
Zealand Rugby Football Union and the professional players' trade union, the New 
Zealand Rugby Players Collective, to successfully negotiate two collective 
employment contracts covering all levels of professional rugby union in New 
Zealand. The paper details the restraints of trade and human rights law issues 
contained in the rules, regulations and policies of rugby unions governing bodies. It 
considers whether they are reasonable or not. It suggests any labour market restraints 
such as transfer rules, salary caps or revenue sharing in New Zealand should be 
negotiated as part of the collective contracts so as honour the principles of teamwork 
set out in the contracts; to take advantage of the fact that employment contracts are 
not captured by the anti-trust laws in the Commerce Act 1986; and to ensure, to the 
greatest extent possible, those restraints are held to be reasonable restraints of trade if 
subject to judicial scrutiny. It suggests a number of the current restraints are likely to 
be held to be unreasonable if challenged by players or others. It suggests that the 
principles and processes of the Employment Relations Act 2000 sit well with the 
values of rugby union . They should be adopted by the International Rugby Board, the 
sports international governing body which should open a dialogue with the players 
international union , the International Rugby Players Association rather than 
maintaining the current stance, along with the major national unions who control it, 
that the each group of national players should negotiate only deal with their national 
rugby union . In other words the hypocrisy of the employers of professional players 
allowing themselves an all powerful employers association which they control while 
insisting the employees equivalent is "redundant" and refusing to deal with it must 
stop. 




" ..... the rule of Jaw, if it is to mean anything, has to embrace state, corporation and 
individual alike; that the laws chief concern about the use of power is not who is exercising it 
but what the power is and whom it affects; and that the control of abuses of power, whether in 
private or in public hands, is probably the most important of all tasks which will be facing the 
courts in the twenty-first century democracy. The sea in which, as citizens, we all have to 
swim in inhabited not only by Leviathan- an alarmingly big but often benign creature- but by 
Jaws; and the law needs to be on the watch for both." 
1 
This is the second paper in a series of papers that have examined aspects of 
how the legislature and the courts have controlled, or should control, the use and 
misuse of power by rugby unions governing bodies.
2 "Jaws" in this case is the 
association of the governing bodies of rugby union and the citizens are the 
professional rugby players. 
This paper is addressed to both the employers of professional rugby players 
and the employees - the players. In New Zealand it suggests that the Employment 
Relations Act 2000 provides both employer and employee with the opportunity to 
work together for the benefit of each other and rugby union as a whole. The policy 
behind the Act and the processes contained in the Act also provide a very sound 
model for the international employers association and supreme governing body - the 
International Rugby Board (IRB) - to interact with the international players 
1 Sir Stephen Sedely "Public Power and Private Power" 291-306, 306 in ., 
- The other papers have examined the effect of Australasian and European statutory competition laws 
on rugby union and the issues surrounding the disciplining of rugby union players with particular 
regard to European, English and New Zealand laws on fair trial rights and the right to natural justice. 
6 
association - the International Rugby Players Association (IRPA).3 To date very 
much at the behest of some of its most powerful national union members the IRB has 
refused to deal directly with IRPA.4 
It outlines the nature of the international and local regulation of rugby union 
and the nature of the employment relationships in New Zealand to demonstrate that 
the need for players to organise collectively in the face of an internationally and 
locally organised group of employers is obvious. 
It examines the application of the common law doctrine against restraints of 
trade to professional rugby union. 5 It suggests incorporating labour market restraints 
into collective agreements in New Zealand to provide maximum protection against 
attack as restraints of trade and immunity from the application of competition law. 
3 lRPA was only established in September 2001. The players associations representing nearly all of 
rugby's professional players are members including France, England, South Africa, Australia and New 
Zealand. 
4 Damien Hopley, CEO of the Professional Rugby Players Association (England) has been quoted 
saying "In an age where sport has become more enlightened -and employer/employee relationships are 
harmonious in most rugby countries around the world- the !RB have abdicated responsibility, and are 
guilty of not showing leadership of an international governing body. Their attitude shows a healthy 
disregard for the players who will be making them vast sums of money." And referring lo the CEO of 
the Australian Rugby Union and !RB Council member John O'Neill's comments about Rugby World 
Cup bonuses for players Hopley said "John O'Neill dismissed !RPA as a redundant organisation, 
saying that the matter should be discussed between players and their National Unions." 
5 This paper is strictly limited to the position of professional rugby union players. It does not focus on 
the position of clubs or national unions seeking entry to competitions or seeking to block the entry of 
others or otherwise restrain trade. There is considerable research available on the general application of 
the common law doctrine of unreasonable restraint of trade to sport, to oval ball team sport and some 
on the NZRFU's 1996 NPC Transfer Regulations. See Michael Beloff, Tim Kerr Marie Demetriou 
"Sports Law" Hart Publishing Oxford 1999, Warren Pengilley "Restraint of Trade and Antitrust: A 
Pigskin Review Post Super League" 6 Canterbury Law Review 1997, 610; Warren Pengilley 
"Sporting Drafts and Restraint of Trade" 10 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 
91994, 89- l 2 I; Adam Lewis and Jonathan Taylor "Sport: Law and Practice" Butterworths London 
2003 A l.35-A l.58 and E2. 32-E2.36;; Shelly Duggan "The New Zealand Rugby Football Union 
Tram/er Arrangements" Victoria University of Wellington LLM Research Paper l 997;Kierin 
Deeming "Restraint of Trade in Professional Sport" LLB(Hons) Research Paper Auckland University 
December 1996 
7 
The history of how outsiders have attacked the control of sports governing 
bodies is canvassed. This shows the good sense in governing bodies developing 
regulations that will withstand challenge. The history also illustrates why working 
with professional players and maintaining their trust is the sensible option for 
employers. 
In competition law, freedom of movement or restraint of trade cases involving 
rugby unions the basis of justification of the restraint or restriction is essentially the 
same. The rugby union, or in the case of restraints in a collective agreement the 
rugby union and the players union, will have to show that the restriction or restraint is 
reasonably related to a legitimate objective and goes no further than is necessary to 
achieve that objective. In other words the restraint is a proportionate response to a 
legitimate objective. 6 
Competition authorities and the courts recognise the special requirements of 
sport for competitive balance between teams in a league, and where promotion 
relegation exists between different competition levels of a sport. They also recognise 
that the need for the development of talent by foundational levels of any sport.
7 
6 If a rugby union's policy or restriction breaches anti -discrimination provisions of human rights or 
employment law the rugby union must rely on a statutory justification (such as being a measure to 
ensure equality) or a statutory exemption. In the absence of any statutory justification or exemption 
there is no opportunity for the rugby union to argue that the discrimination is designed to meet a 
legitimate objective. 
7 Commerce Commission Decision No 281 dated 17 December 1996 and Rugby Union Players · 
Association Inc v Commerce Co111111ission (No 2) [ 1997] 3 NZLR, 30 I; Warren Pengilley "Restraint of 
Trade and Amitrusr: A Pigskin Review Post Super League .. 6 Canterbury Law Review 1997, 610 
8 
Globally rugby bodies, clubs and players operate within a pyramid structure 
that has the International Rugby Board (IRB) at the apex of the pyramid. The pyramid 
is built from the foundational school and club organisational level, through different 
levels of regional bodies to the national governing bodies that are joined together by 
the agreement that constitutes the IRB. All lower levels of the pyramid are 
subordinate to the legislative, regulatory and judicial functions of the bodies above 
them. The international rugby union pyramid, relative to sports like soccer, is small 
(in terms of total players)8, narrow (players are concentrated in less than ten countries) 
and undemocratic (political power is concentrated in the hands of eight unions). The 
professional sport is also, relative to sports like soccer, small, new and 
underdeveloped. 
Since rugby union allowed players to be paid for their work in 1996 many new 
regulations have been introduced which were not deemed necessary to the good 
governance of the game in the over one hundred years the game was played before 
then. To the extent they restrict or restrain players a players right to work rugby 
unions will need to justify them if they are challenged.9 
8 3000 professional rugby players against 130,000 professional soccer players 
9 The orthodox rugby pyramid was challenged in the early days of professional rugby in 1996. By 
World Rugby Corporation which attempted to set up a worldwide league. In Europe the Welsh Rugby 
Union was clearly surprised to find that two of its most famous clubs Cardiff and Ebbw Vale were able 
to convince a judge that the had established a serious case that the WRU was imposing unreasonable 
restraints of trade on them. The courts should not interfere in sport argument did not work see Williams 
and Cardiff RFC v WRU ( !RB intervening)[ 1999) Eu LR 195 and when the English First Division 
Clubs complained to the European Commission about the anti-competitive conduct of the !RB and its 
member national unions: EDFR Complaint to the European Commission against the Rugby Football 
Union and the lntemational Rugby Board Case No IV36.994 March 1998 (unreported) see Adam 
Lewis and Jonathan Taylor above at A3.20, A3.3 l, A3. l 66 and 82.119. The respective parties settled 
the issues and the cases did not proceed. The English and Welsh clubs secured their financial position 
so it can be assumed there was some strength in their cases. 
9 
A considerable amount of this paper is spent illustrating the nature of the 
monolithic pyramid structure under which the game is organised. If the full picture is 
not fully understood the extent to which the game of rugby union is controlled by 
national unions and in particular by eight national unions, including New Zealand's, 
and the nature of that control will not be understood nor will the importance of the 
interrelationship of employment contracts and the legislative and regulatory activity 
of rugby unions governing bodies. 10 
Once the structure of the pyramid is fully exposed it is obvious that the 
national unions that control the IRB have near monopoly control of the labour market 
for professional players within their national territory and that acting together they 
have an international monopoly over the regulation of the employment of professional 
players. 
In New Zealand the Employment Relations Act 2000 changed the distribution 
of power in the rugby employment relationship in the favour of the players and has 
had a profound and positive effect on the employment relationships of professional 
rugby union players in New Zealand. Collective agreements were entered into in 2001 
between a trade union representing all of the professional players in New Zealand and 
a single employer company, which then seconded the players to rugby unions as they 
were selected by those unions to play in teams. 
10 The importance of understanding the complete picture is well illustrated by two recent cases both of 
which involved the AuckJand Rugby Football Union Waikato Rugby Union ( Inc) v New Zealand Rugby 
Football Union ( Inc) Unreported Employment Court decision (WC46/02; WRC 37/02) Wellington 12 
November 2002; LO December 2002 Judge CM Shaw and Auckland Rugby Football Union v ACC 
unreported District Court decision of March 2003. ln both cases the fact that the NZRFU and all twenty 
seven provincial New Zealand rugby unions had agreed that players were employees and not 
independent contractors was ignored as the parties put forward arguments, affidavits and Agreed 
statements of fact about a contract or contracts purporting to be contracts of service. 
10 
As a newcomer to the world of professional sport rugby union has the 
opportunity to differentiate itself in a way that ultimately will prove commercially 
valuable. It could confound the cynics. The owners 11 and professional players could 
ensure the grassroots of the sport truly shares the benefit of the professional game. 
Professional rugby umon 1s a business where success is dependent on 
attracting, developing and keeping the most talented workers. Professional rugby 
union players today are not greedy compared to players in other professional sport. 12 
Organised collectively players can and will eventually gain very high shares of the 
revenues earned by the sport unless they are convinced of the merits of investing in 
the future of the game. They must be treated as partners and involved in making the 
fundamental decisions about the split of the sports revenues. Otherwise they will 
simply take an increasing share of the revenues at the expense of the grassroots of the 
sport. They could do this within the current structure or they could establish 
competitions owned by the players associations as has happened in a number of 
sports. Governing bodies that see professional players as workers to be kept in their 
11 The various governing bodies are the "owners" of rugby union unlike the situation in American 
p,rofessio~al sport where private individuals or companies own teams and leagues. 
- Professional rugby players cannot be charged with bemg greedy 10 relation to the share of the 
NZRFU's revenue they expect to earn. In its "Competitions Review 2003" published on November 24 
2003 available at http://www.allblacks.com (last accessed 25 November 2003) the NZRFU states that 
players salaries accounted for 25% of expenses in 2002. Analysis of the NZRFU' s 2002 accounts also 
available at the same website shows that means 18% of the NZRFU's total revenues are spent on 
players wages.( the figure is slightly understated because the NZRFU earns the broadcasting rights fees 
and competition sponsorship for NPC rugby but does not pay NPC players other than by paying 
NZ$ l 5,000 in each Super 12 contract for players to play in the NPC and topping up unions who do not 
have Super 12 players in NPC Division One).This can be compared to a maximum salary cap of 39% 
of English First Division rugby revenues being spent on player payments; In soccer player payments as 
a percentage of revenue are 70% in FA Premier League, 90% in Portuguese soccer, 69% in 
Netherlands soccer, 64% in French soccer and 50% in German soccer (source Jonathan Taylor and 
Mike Newton "Salary Caps -The Legal Analysis" available at http://www.hammonds (last accessed 
20 October 2003)) 
11 
place by an outmoded paternalistic control structure are missing the chance to create a 
better future for the sport they are entrusted to protect. 
For those who believe sport is just another business and the way forward is to 
oppose the greater involvement of professional players in the development of the 
sport here are three things to think about: 
When professional players have decided to orgamse and owners or 
administrators have sought to quash them the players have always won 
eventually. 
When unionised players have been locked out or gone on strike they 
have always won compared to the owners and administrators. The 
sport has a whole has often lost. 
" ..... !believed I could apply to professional football the same principles of good business 
management that had enabled me to succeed in the corporate world. There was also a 
time when I believed in Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny, and the Tooth fairy." 13 
13 Gene Klein owner of the San Diego Chargers for nearly twenty years quoted in Leeds Mand von 
Allmen P "The Eco110111ics of Sports" Addison Wesley Boston, 2002 , 69 footnote I, Eugene Klein 
"First Down and a Billion: The Funny Business of Pro Football" Morrow ew York 1987 
12 
II HOW THE LAW PROTECTS PLAYERS RIGHT TO. WORK 
A The Common Law protections 
In the age of human rights treaties, conventions and statutes the role of the 
common law in the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals from abuse of 
power by those private or public bodies imbued with it is often forgotten but the 
ability of the common law to protect them is also sometimes overstated. In R v East 
London and the City Mental Health NHS Trust exp van Brandenburg
14Lord Bingham 
discussing governing or overriding principles held that: 15 
"First, the common law respects and protects the personal freedom of the individual, which 
may not be curtailed save for a reason and in circumstances sanctioned by the law of the land. 
This principle is renected in , but does not depend upon, article 5( l) of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. It can be traced back to chapter 29 of Magna Carta t 297 and 
before that to chapter 39 of Magna Carta t 215." 
Some might claim, with some justification, that the common law has not 
always protected personal freedom of employees in many areas. The common law 
14 [2003] UKHL 58 ( 13 November 2003) available at 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKH U2003/58.html (last accessed 28 November 2003) The case 
involved the committal of a mentally ill person in circumstances where he had been recently discharged 
after being committed and it was alleged there had been no change in circumstances before he was 
recommitted 
15 above paragraph 6 
13 
has though been remarkably consistent through the years in protecting employees 
from unlawful restraints of trade and curbing the abuse of public or private monopoly 
power where it affects employees. It has been much less successful in dealing with the 
imbalance of bargaining power in employment relationships. 
B The Statutory protection of professional rugby players fundamental 
rights 
Statutory employment law would fall very broadly into the area of positive 
rights that may directly or indirectly protect New Zealand professional rugby 
players. 16 In New Zealand the just distribution of power within relationships is at the 
heart of the policy underpinning the Employment Relations Act 2000. 
17 As shall be 
seen this Act has contributed to a considerable rebalancing of power between players 
and rugby unions in New Zealand. 
The anti-discrimination provisions of the Employment Relations Act 2000 and 
the Human Rights Act 1993 18 protect rugby players from discrimination on grounds 
including race, ethnic or national origins (which includes nationality or citizenship). 
There are exemptions for some sports activities in the Human Rights Act 1993
19 but 
there are none in the Employment Relations Act 2000. The potential significance of 
the fact that this may make the selection of employees to play teams on the basis of 
national ongm or race or nationality based quotas in competition rules in New 
16 Sir John Laws "Public Power and E111ploy111ent Law: Abuse of Power [ 1997] Public Law 455, 457 
17 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the anti discrimination provisions of the Human 
Rights Act 1993, the Employment Relations Act 2000, the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) and the 
Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome( the European Treaty) all assert positive rights. They are not within 
the scope of this paper but may have considerable affects on the employment of professional 
18 Sections 104 to 106 Employment Relations Act 2000 and ections 21,22 and 49 Human Rights Act 
1993 
19 Section 49 Human Rights Act 1993 
14 
Zealand is illustrated by the fact that the equivalent United Kingdom legislation, the 
Race Relations Act 1976 (UK) section 39 provides: 
"Nothing in this Part II to IV shall render unlawful any act whereby a person discriminates 
against another on the basis of the others nationality or place of birth or length of time for which he has 
been resident in a particular area or place if the act is done: 
(a) in selecting one or more persons to represent , a country place or area or related association 
in any sport or game; or 
(b) in pursuance of any rules of any competition so far as they relate to eligibility to compete 
in any sport or game."20 
C Professional rugby union is at the edge of a legal divide 
Sport has been said to be at the edge of the divide between public and private 
law.2' Employment law has also been described as a field "where the public/private 
divide is particularly fragile." 22 
w Section 39 (b) has been rendered meaningless by for citizens of the European Union and citizens of 
countries including South Africa, the Caribbean, the Pacific Islands and Eastern Europe where 
appropriate co-operation agreements have been signed by Case C-13176 Dona v Mantero ( July 14 
1976) I CMLR 576 ( l976)Case C-415/93 Union Royale Beige des Socities de Football Ass'n v Jean 
Marc Bosman (December 15 1995) (1996) l CMLR 645 ("the Bosman case")Deutscher I--landballbund 
eY v Maras Kolpak [2003) Case C-438/00 ECJ Celex Lexis May 8 2003It would however still appear 
to be lawful to discriminate against New Zealanders or Australians , not otherwise allowed to work 
lawfully in the European Union. 
21 The phrase "at edge of the divide" was used by Lord Woolf in "Droit Public- English Style" (1994) 
PL 57, 64 where he wrote "The controlling bodies of sport ......... can exercise monopolistic 
powers ........ How then as a last resort can the courts be justifiably excluded? We are however here at 
the edge of the divide, trying to clarify a boundary which is indistinct and evolving." The idea of rights 
such as the right to work and the principles of judicial review or fairness meeting at the divide comes 
from Cooke J's judgement in Stininato v Auckland Boxing Association Inc [ 1978) 1 NZLR l (CA), 24 
where he said "in this kind of case there is a meeting of the principles of natural justice and fairness 
(treating those terms as synonymous) and the principles as to unreasonable restraint of trade." 
22 Sir John Laws "Public Power and Employmel!I Law: Abuse of Power [ l 997) Public Law 455, 458 
where Laws went on to say that" ..... the substantive law of employment, though dressed in the garb of 
the private law of bargains, in some instances exhibits on analysis underlying features that may be said 
to belong in the public law world." 
15 
The courts, particularly the Australasian courts have shown a willingness to 
examine the misuse of power by governing bodies and competition organisers.
23The 
only distinction between the English law and the Australasian law is in the area of 
judicial review where the English Courts have been reluctant to intervene.
24 How long 
this will last is the subject of much interest in the United Kingdo~. 25 
D Would the New Zealand players have standing to seek declarations 
against the IRB or NZRFU? 
The New Zealand players are in a direct employment contact with NZRPL. It 
is probable that the courts would look at the substance of the employment relationship 
and say the relationship extended to include the provincial unions and the NZRFU. 
Even if the courts did not do so the lack of a contractual relationship does not 
23 Blackler v New Zealand Rugby Football League Inc [ 1968] NZLR 547; Sti11inato v Auckland Boxing 
Association Inc [ 1978) I NZLR I (CA), 24; Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc [ 1985] 
2 NZLR I 59;Fi1111igan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc (No2) [ 1985) 2 NZLR 181; Finnigan 
v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc (No3) [ 1985] 2 NZLR 190; Kemp v New Zealand Rugby 
Football League Inc [ 1989] 3 NZLR 463;Loe v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc unreported 
High Court Wellington decision 10 August 1993 CP209/93; Le Roux v New Zealand Rugby Football 
Union Inc unreported High Court Wellington decision 14 March 1995 CP346!94;Adamson v New 
South Wales Rugby League Ltd ( 1991) 100 ALR 479; Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd 
( 1991) 103 A LR 319:Adamson v West Perth F ootba/l Club ( 1979) 27 ALR 475; Buckley v Tutty ( 1972) 
ALR 370;Foschini v Victorian Football League (1983) Supreme Court Victoria No 9868/82 15 April 
1983 (unreported);Hall v Victorian Football League (1997) 58 FLR I 80;Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v 
Australian Rugby Union Ltd (2000) FCA 823; Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Union Ltd 
(200 I) FCA 1040;Hoszowski v Brown ( 1978) Supreme Court ew South Wales No 1667/78 6 October 
1978 (unreported);News Limited v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd ( 1996) 135 ALR 33;News 
Limited v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd ( 1996) 139 ALR I 93;News Limited & Ors v Sowh 
Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Limited & Ors (2000) 177 ALR 611 (appealed to High 
Court of Australia decision reserved);News Limited v Sowh Sydney District Rugby League Football 
Club Ltd ( the South Sydney case) Unreported decision of the High Court of Australia (2003) HCA 45 
S34/2002 delivered 13 August 2003 Kirby ];Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Limited (1985) 
180 CLR 459 
24 Law v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd (1963] I WLR 1302; R v Football Association exp 
Football League Ltd [ 1993] 2 All ER 833; R v Jockey Club exp Massi11gberd-Mundy [ 1993] 2 All ER 
207; R v Jockey Club exp Aga Khan [ 1993] I WLR 909 
25 Taylor and Lewis (eds) "Sport: Law and Practice" Butterworths London 2003, A3.64-A3.69; 
Michael Beloff "Pitch, Pool.Rink .. . Court? Judicial Review in the Sporting World" (1989) Public Law 
150; Beloff, Kerr, Demetriou "Sports Law" Hart Publishing Oxford 1999, 8.9-8.28 
16 
preclude the players from seeking declarations that the rules and regulations of the 
IRB, NZRFU or provincial unions constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
In Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v The Football Association Ltd and 
another26Lord Denning MR made a number of important observations about the 
nature of the rules of a sports governing body. In that case it was the governing body 
of English soccer. The observations are just as relevant to the international, national 
and provincial governing bodies of rugby union in common law jurisdictions. 
Lord Denning dismissed the idea that the rules of a sports governing body 
were a contract between those subject to them and the governing body. He described 
that idea as a fiction invented by lawyers to give the courts jurisdiction:27 
"Putting the fiction aside, the truth is that the rules are nothing more nor less than a legislative 
code-a set of regulations laid down by the governing body to be observed by all who are, or 
become members of the association. Such regulations, although said to be a contract, are 
subject to the control of the courts. If they are in unreasonable restraint of trade, they are 
invalid: see Dickson v Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain. If they seek to oust the 
jurisdiction of the court they are invalid: see Scott v Avery. If they unreasonably shut out a 
man from his right to work, they are invalid: see Nagle v Feilden and Edwards v Society of 
Graphical and Allied Trades. If they lay down a procedure which is contrary to the principles 
of natural justice, they are invalid: see Faramus v Film Artistes' Association [ 1964] l All ER 
25 at 33 ....... " 
26 [I97l] 1AllER215,2l9 
27 Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v The Football Association Ltd and another [ 1971) 1 All ER 215, 
219. 
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Lord Denning continued that the courts could hold a rule that was against 
public policy invalid even if it was contained in a contract. He cited St Johnstone 
Football Club Ltd v Scottish Football Association28 as an example of that reality. 
This view of the courts jurisdiction has been strongly endorsed by the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal directly in relation the NZRFU's relationship with players 
who are club members. The fact that amateur rugby players who are members of 
rugby clubs are not in a contractual relationship with the NZRFU or the provincial 
union of which their club is a member was established in Finnigan v NZRFU. 
29 The 
Court of Appeal rejected any contractual relationship between the club players and the 
rugby unions of which their club or provincial rugby union were members. The club 
members attempted to imply contracts between each of them and the NZRFU. Cooke 
J held: 
"This is quite untenable. The plaintiffs are slated to be members of their respective clubs, 
which are also incorporated soc ie ties . As such members they have a contractual relationship 
with their clubs and possibly with their fellow members. In turn the clubs and their delegates 
(i t is nol necessary for the present purposes to differentiate) are members of the Auck.land 
Rugby Football Union, likewise incorporated under the Incorporated Societies Act. So there 
are similar contractual relationships at that leve l. Then the Auck.land Union is one of the 27 
affiliated unions which are members of the New Zealand Union: with the consequence again 
that contracts exist between the New Zealand Union and the affi liated unions. Thus there is a 
28 (1965] SLT 171 
29 Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc [ l 9851 2 NZLR 159, l 78-179. The Court of 
Appeal reaffirmed its views in Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union (No 3) [ 1985] 190, 199-
200 when the court dismissed the NZRFU's request for leave to appeal to the Privy Council see the 
judgement of Richardson J " in our judgement of 21 July 1985 we he ld in cases where an incorporated 
association is alleged to have acted against its objects and so outside its jurisdiction as a statutory body, 
but the plaintiff is not in a direct contractual relationship with the incorporated association, standing to 
sue may be determined on an assessment of all the circumstances on a case by case or category by 
category basis." 
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hierarchy based on a structure of interlocking contracts. It would distort the pattern, without 
any justification, if the courts were to invent direct contracts between all club members and 
the parent ew Zealand Union."
30 
Four of the categories where the courts would intervene in the application of 
the rules and regulations of a governing body with monopoly power despite the 
absence of any contract are outlined in Enderby Town they are: 
unreasonable restraint of trade 
ouster of jurisdiction of the courts 
unreasonable shutting out of a persons right to work 
procedure is a breach of natural justice 
Finnigan adds a fifth category, so far limited to New Zealand, where the 
sporting organisation is in a position of major national importance and the 
organisations decision will affect the nation as a whole. 
The courts have therefore asserted a supervisory jurisdiction over bodies with 
monopoly powers including sports bodies in private pre-contractual and non-
contractual situations . In English law the supervisory jurisdiction is not wide because 
of the English Courts traditional reticence to interfere in the private affairs of sports 
organisations. In New Zealand and other Commonwealth jurisdictions the courts have 
3° Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc [ 19851 2 NZLR 159, 178 
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been willing to interfere more readily. Dawn Oliver has summarised the English 
. . f 11 31 pos1t1on as o ows: 
"Unless bias, unfairness, arbitrariness or capriciousness are established, there will be 110 
interference by the courts in private bodies having no contractual relationship with the 
plaintif.f 32 Even if those grounds are established a court may by it discretion refuse a remedy. 
But if those grounds are established, and if vital interests33 or the public interest are affected, 
then a rnpen,isory jurisdiction in private law may be exercisable.". 
Even in England, where the courts, unlike their New Zealand counterparts, 
have been reluctant to extend the doctrine of judicial review to sporting organisations 
the courts have recognised duties of legality, rationality and procedural fairness in 
contract law where an individuals fundamental rights are affected.
34 These duties have 
also been imposed on employers by statute in the United Kingdom and New Zealand 
in the provisions in employment statutes35 
E The Doctrine against restraint of trade and its general application to 
sport and rugby union 
It took the English courts nearly sixty years to apply Lord McNaughten 's 
famous doctrine against the restraint of trade36 to sport m Eastham v Newcastle 
31 Dawn Oliver "Is the Ultra Vires Rule the basis for Judicial Review ? in Christopher Forsyth (ed) 
"Judicial Review & the Constitution" Hart Publishing Oxford 2000, 3-27, 16-17 
32 " R v Trent Regional Health Authority, The Times June 19 1986" 
33 "These include "rights to work". They do not, it seems, include mere reputation were no gainful 
activity is involved: Currie v Barber, The Times March 27 1987; cf. Fisher v Keane( 1878) 11 Ch D 
387. See also Cowley v Heatley The Times July 24 1986." 
34 Dawn Oliver "Is the Ultra Vires Rule the basis for Judicial Review ? in Christopher Forsyth (ed) 
"Judicial Review & the Constitution" Hart Publishing Oxford 2000, 3-27, 317 
35 In New Zealand the Employment Relations Act 2000 
36 Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and A111111u11itio11 [ 1894 J 535, 565 where Lord McNaughten 
held: 
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United. 37 The case involved the retention and transfer rules of the Football 
Association and the Football League. The retention system was held to be an unlawful 
restraint of trade.38 Justice Wilberforce posed the questions that must be asked today 
in relation to the rules and regulations of the IRB and NZRFU. He asked: 
"( I )Are rhe rules of rlze Associarion and rhe regularions of rhe League in resrrainr of 
rrade ?(2)/f so, are rhe resrraims 110 more rhan such as are reasonably necessary for rhe 
prorecrion of rhe Associario11 or r/ze League or of rheir members?( 3) Has rhe courr any 
j11risdicrio11 ro declare rhea rhe rerention and Transfer sysre111 is invalid againsr any and all of 
the defendanrs ?( 4 )If so, should rhe coim exercise rhar jurisdicrion ?( 5) Has rhe plainriff a rigllf 
ro damages?" 
In short his honours answers were (l) Yes. (2) No the restraints go too far. (3) 
Yes. (4) Yes and (5) No but he bas the right to a declaration against the association of 
employers. The onus is on the party alleging the restraint to prove the restraint. If that 
is proved the party seeking to rely on the restraint must prove it to be reasonable. If 
that is done it is up to the other party to prove that allowing the restraint is not in the 
public interest. 
The players union, the Professional Footballers Association was after the 
success m Eastham able to negotiate significant changes in -the system. These are 
"The public have an interest in every person's carrying on his trade freely; so has the 
individual. All interference with liberty of action in trading, and all restraints of trade 
themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public policy, and, therefore void. That is 
the general rule." 
Lord McNaughten held there could be exceptions to the general rule if in the special circumstances of 
the case the restriction is reasonable by reference to the interests of the parties and to the interests of the 
public. Any restraint must provide adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed but in 
no way injure the public interest. 
37 
[ 1963] 3 All ER 139 
38 This in turn practically undermined the transfer system but the case did not decide that the transfer 
system was an unlawful restraint of trade as sometimes thought. 
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reported to have included freer transfer arrangements, independent tribunals to resolve 
salary disputes and free agency for senior players. 39 
In relation to the professional rugby players position regarding the IRB it is 
significant that Justice Wilberforce held:40 
" the court has jurisdiction to grant a declaratory judgement, not only against the employer but 
against the association of employers whose rules and regulations place an unjustifiable 
restraint on his liberty of employment. A case where the employee is himself contractually 
bound by the employer's rules (as the employee is here, by virtue of registration and the terms 
of his contract) is a fortiori to the las t case mentioned." 
The issue of proof of the need for the restraint is important because the onus is 
on the proponent of the restraint to prove the need for it. This may involve a very 
much higher level of scrutiny of the reasoning of the sports body than the standard of 
41 Wednesbury unreasonableness. 
A good example of what the courts demand by way of proof and where a 
sports governing body failed to prove the damage it claimed the actions it had taken 
were designed to mitigate is Greg v lnsole. 42 There it was held after requiring all the 
relevant national bodies to submit proof of the financial effects of the proposed World 
Series Cricket that only the Australian governing body was likely to suffer financial 
loss and that it was beyond the powers of the other national governing bodies 
39 Dabscheck, Braham "Sport, Human Rights and Industrial Relations" [2000) 7 AJHR 129 
40 1963] 3 All ER 139, 157 
41 The current position is unsettled on one hand you have Stevenage Borough Football FC Limited v 
The Football League Limited unreported transcript 23 July 1996 Carnwath J suggesting the test is the 
Wed11esb1111ry type test because of the public nature of the sports body (also an argument for judicial 
review in the United Kingdom) . On the other hand you have Newport AFC Limited v The Football 
Associarion unreported 12 April l 995 Bla~kburne J rejecting that and preferring to treat the situation as 
a contractual or quasi contractual case and require significant justification for the restraint see Beloff, 
Kerr, Demetriou 3.42- 3.44 
42 Greig v !11sole [ 1978] 3 All ER 449,496,497,503 
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individually or collectively as the unincorporated world governing body to act to 
protect the Australian governing body. 
Eastham was followed in New Zealand in Blackler v New Zealand Rugby 
League (lncorporated), 43 Stininato v Auckland Boxing Association (lnc), 44 Kemp v 
New Zealand Rugby Football League Jnc. 45 It was also followed in Australia in 
Buckley v Tutty. 46The Commerce Act 1986 preserves the doctrine in so far as it is not 
inconsistent with the Commerce Act.47 
The application of the doctrine to transfer regulations in professional rugby 
u111on in New Zealand was considered in Rugby Union Players Association Inc v 
Commerce Commission (No2./8The High Court held m relation to the Commerce 
Commission's proposed counterfactual and RUPA's contention that it would be 
struck down as an unreasonable restraint of trade that: 49 
"the imposition of a transfer fee does automatically lead to a restraint of trade. It all depends 
on the circumstances and a balancing of the interests of the player and the wider interests of 
the game and all players." 
43 
[ 1968) NZLR 547 ,per North P 554-555 
44 
[ 1977) NZLR I, per Richmond P 7 
45 
[ 1989) 3 NZLR 463, per Henry J 470 
46 [1971] 125 CLR 353,381 
47 section 7(1) Commerce Act 1986 
48 
[ 1997] 3 ZLR 30 I, 314-318. One of the odd aspects of this case was that the players counsel did 
not argue the restraint of trade point and it was left to the Commission Counsel to inform the court 
which she did by reference to a presentation made by Warren Pengilley to a conference of sports 
lawyers. The presentation was later published as an article Warren Pengilley "Restraint of Trade and 
Antitrust: A Pigskin Review Post Super League" 6 Canterbury Law Review 1997, 610. Pengilley's 
article only brieOy mentions Eastham and Bosman and neither are mentioned in the High Court 
judgement no doubt because of its anti-trust linkage. The failure to inform the court of the likely impact 
of Bosman in Europe on transfer regulations was odd given the extent of the public debate in Europe. 
While Bosman is not a restraint of trade case the principles that underlie the freedom of movement of 
worker cases for professional players in Europe are similar and due to the Eurocentric nature of the 
IRB could have been anticipated to affect, as they did, the IRB's regulations on transfer of players. 
49 Above at 318 
The doctrine has not been applied in New Zealand to the imposition of salary 
caps imposed to control costs and control costs because to date there have been none. 
50 The issue was left open in Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League. 51 
It is clear that the doctrine will apply to any restraints of trade in the byelaws, 
rules, regulations, employment contracts or participation agreements of the IRB, the 
NZRFU, the provincial rugby unions and NZRPL. It is also clear that a player has 
standing to sue the governing body even if there is no contractual relationship. 
III THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROFESSIONAL RUGBY UNION 
A The "instant and cataclysmic change" 52 
The world that employers and employees inhabit in professional sport is well 
illustrated by the events of the creation of professional rugby union in the middle of 
1995 in South Africa, New Zealand and Australia. When change comes it comes 
swiftly. 
50 for a comprehensive view on the legality of salary caps see Jonathan Taylor and Mike Newton 
"Salary Caps - The Legal Analysis" available at http ://www.hammonds (last accessed 20 October 
2003)) The NZRFU is now proposing to introduce salary caps in the NPC by 2006. It has not had to 
introduce them at higher levels of the sport in New Zealand because the NZRPL centrally contracts all 
Super 12 and All Black players and therefore controls the salaries itself. There is a salary cap in place 
in English rugby union that was negotiated between the clubs players and national union. 
51 i 19911100 ALR479, [1991] 103 ALR 319 
52 !RFU Strategic Planning Group 2003 "Taking Irish Rugby Forward " !RFU Consultative Document 
available from the Irish Rugby Football Union 
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World rugby is still at the very early stages of its professional development. At 
the start of 1995 players were not paid to play and broadcasting rights contracts were 
for modest amounts with free to air broadcasters. By the end of 1995 players were 
paid to play and massive increases in broadcasting rights fees were achieved from 
subscription television broadcasters. In the meantime the national bodies almost lost 
control of the sport.53 The change was sudden and the players and national unions had 
all faced pressures and choices they had not expected to face. The players had for 
example been heavily involved in the rugby war between the SANZAR national 
rugby unions and World Rugby Corporation. Many had signed contracts with the 
WRC. 
The most accurate account of what happened in 1995 is that: 54 
After the code had Ii ved on a diet of fresh air and love for well over a century, it was 
the year that the three major national Rugby Unions in the southern hemisphere signed a deal 
with a massive media corporation guaranteeing them over half a billion American dollars in 
return for a decade's worth of television rights. 
In reply, an organisation called the World Rugby Corporation launched a stunning 
counter-coup, contracting most of the planet's best players from all the major Unions to an 
alternative competition set up on a global basis. 
It was, as a consequence the year of the Rugby War ... 
53 France was an exception in so far as national bodies losing control was concerned because the Loi du 
Sport (Act no. 84-610, July 16 1984, JO of 17 July 1984, Article I, paragraph 4) recognises the 
development of sport including national sport as duty of the state. In France the national rugby union is 
recognised as the governing body of rugby union by the state and is has the exclusive licence to licence 
participation in the sport in France and to authorise events. See Adam Lewis and Jonathan Taylor 
"Sport: Law and Practice" Butterworths London 2003 ,A 1.11-A 1.112. There is much to commend in 
the French approach because it recognises the public nature of a national sports bodies function and 
makes it clearly subject to the public law in the exercise of its controlling powers. 
54 Peter Fitzsimons "The Rugby War" Harper Sports 1996,vii 
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When the war was over , the International Rugby Football Board, even if Missing In 
Action throughout - formalised the already apparent. They announced that the code would 
henceforth abandon its famous amateur ethos and instead embrace outright professionalism." 
WRC began as a suggested response by Kerry Packers interests to News 
Corporation's (News) attack, with the Superleague rugby league, on the Australian 
rugby leagues governing bodies' national championship, for which Packers interests 
owned the broadcasting rights. WRC set out to establish a world rugby competition 
in which the world's top players would compete in international nation against nation 
rugby and in a league composed of teams based around the world. WRC wanted 
rugby unions governing bodies involved. They would own 50% of the teams. WRC 
did not expect the rugby unions to come of their own free will. WRC saw getting the 
players contracted to WRC as the key to getting the unions on their side. It was to be a 
player driven revolution .55WRC's strategy was similar to the strategy News had 
adopted with rugby league a year earlier in Australia. 
It is always accepted by the attacker that working with the governing body is 
economically preferable but contracting the players is essential. Governing bodies are 
not renowned for embracing outsiders so the key strategy adopted by attackers is to 
contract as many of the elite players as possible preferably before the governing body 
knows of the attacker's plans . Having secured the players the attacker will try and 
gain the co-operation of the governing body. 
The strategy of News and the response of the Australian Rugby league and its 
allies are well documented in News Limited &Ors v Australian Rugby Football 
55 Peter Fitzsimons "The Rugby War " Harper Sports 1996, 14 
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League Limited & Ors. 56 What happened when the crickets governing bodies control 
was attacked in 1977 by a combination of a broadcaster and elite players is 
documented in Greig and others v Insole and others.57 The most recent example of a 
similar battle, this time between a players association that controlled the professional 
sport worldwide and a breakaway group of elite players and commercial interests is 
Hendry and Others v The World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association 
Ltcl58. What happens when attacker and defending governing body reach a peace deal 
is outlined in the South Sydney 59case. The cases involving rugby league in Australia 
are all the more relevant in the context of rugby union because of the very significant 
involvement of News in the ownership of rugby union broadcasting rights. 
In all cases the key was control of the best players and a broadcasting contract. 
The governing bodies attempted to keep control through regulation and contract. The 
attackers used competition law and the doctrine against unreasonable restraints of 
trade to attack the governing bodies. It is therefore wise for governing bodies to have 
the players on their team and to ensure that rules and regulations that govern the sport 
cannot be attacked as unreasonable restraints of trade. 
56 News Limited &Ors v Australian Rugby Football League Limited & Ors (1996) 18 ATPR 41-521, 
42-579,42-582, 42-590 contains detailed references to the News Limited strategy which outlines the 
three options open to anyone trying to gain a place in a professional sport with or without the support 
of the governing bodies of that sport. 
57 [1978] 3 All ER 449, 463-483 
58 [2002] UKCLR 5 
59 News Limited & Ors v SoLtth Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Limited & Ors (2000) 177 
ALR 611 and News Limited v South Sydney District RLtgby League Football Club Ltd ( the South 
Sydney case) Unreported decision of the High Court of Australia [2003] HCA 45 S34/2002 delivered 
13 August 2003 Kirby J 
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B Relations between professional players and rugby unions in New Zealand 
Since the end of the "rugby war" the relationship between the professional 
players and the national and provincial rugby unions in New Zealand has been 
relatively non confrontational.60 There were significant confrontations in relation to 
the introduction of the NZRFU's NPC Transfer Regulations61 and the 2003 Rugby 
6? World Cup bonus payments. -
In the early years of professional rugby in New Zealand the rugby unions, the 
players association and the players all preferred to characterise the players as 
independent contractors. The primary reason for this was likely the perceived (but not 
necessarily real other than in exceptional cases) tax advantages for players and the 
minimisation of some statutory levies or avoidance of responsibilities such as 
employee safety legislation or holiday's legislation. There was also no encouragement 
for collective bargaining in the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
60 In that time the Australian Rugby Union has been involved in litigation with the players union twice, 
once over a failure to implement the Ferrier Agreement and once over the Rugby World Cup 
participation agreement and bonuses. The Welsh Rugby Unions international players have gone on 
strike twice. The English rugby union players have taken strike action once and threatened it on 
another. The English and Australian players have achieved a far greater stake in the governance of the 
game than the New Zealand players. It is inevitable that some player representation at board level will 
be demanded and won in the future in New Zealand. Concerns that the NZRFU Board had no All Black 
player representation have abated with the election in 2002, of Jock Hobbs and Graham Mourie(both 
ex All Black captains) to the NZRFU Board. Current NZRFU President (Tane orton) and vice-
President ( John Graham) are past All Black captains. Graham has also been a manager of professional 
cricket and rugby teams and Mourie has coached in the modern era. However there is still no formal 
player representative nor anyone who has played in the professional era on the Board. 
1 See Application by the NZRFU ( 23 September 1996) Submissions of the NZRFU and the Rugby 
Union Players Association to the Commerce Commission in relation to the NZRFU's application for 
authorisation of a restrictive trade practice and Commerce Commission Decision No 281 dated 17 
December 1996 and Rugby Union Players' Association Inc v Commerce Commission ( No 2) [ 1997] 3 
NZLR, 301. For discussion on the implications of this case see Warren Pengilley "Restraint of Trade 
and Antitrust: A Pigskin Review Post Super League" 6 Canterbury Law Review 1997, 610, 650-656 
note that this article is based on the conference paper by Pengilley that Smellie J refers to in Rugby 
Union Players· Association Inc v Commerce Commission (No 2) [ 1997] 3 NZLR, 301, 314 
62 This. was eventually settled after reference to mediation under the Employment Relations Act 2000. 
Both the NZRFU and the players union praised the mediation process and the mediators. 
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By the end of 1999 there was a considerable level of dissatisfaction amongst 
players and their representatives about a number of aspects of their relationship with 
the NZRFU and the provincial rugby unions. In many respects this was because of a 
lack of transparency about who was being paid what63 and a concern about whether 
the terms of all contracts were fair and consistent. 
There was a concern that was evident as far back as the players association's 
evidence before the Commerce Commission and the High Court in 1996
64 that the 
NZRFU did not properly consult with the players on important issues that affected 
them. At that time one of the key issues was the length of the season and the number 
of matches players were expected to play. The New Zealand players were also aware 
of what the Australian rugby union players had achieved by acting collectively under 
the leadership of Tony Dempsey.65 
63 The NZRFU's position has been that it would be happy to publish details of players salaries if that is 
what the players wanted. The disadvantage to the NZRFU is that it could be the basis of competitive 
di sadvantage as off shore employers would understand what they had to pay. The disadvantage for the 
players would be that players who chose to play overseas would be offered less than they are currently 
offered if off shore interests understood the pay structure -the feeling being that people overestimate 
the amounts being paid to players in New Zealand. The advantages would be an improved and 
objective basis for salary discussions and potentially the basis for the introduction of a salary 
arbitrations system. Clearly the NZRFU is in no position to impose such a system because of the 
p.layers privacy rights. 
4 Commerce Commission Decision no 281 Application by the NZRFU for authorisation of a 
restrictive practice and Rugby Union Players Association v Co111111erce Co111111issio11 ( No2) [ 1997] 3 
NZLR 301 
65 Unlike the New Zealand players (and possibly because there were a smaller group of Australian 
players at that time and greater legislative encouragement of collective bargaining) the Australian 
players negotiated collectively with the ARU from the outset. The initial result was extraordinary but 
probably unsustainable in terms of revenue share but clearly demonstrates the potential power of elite 
sports players negotiating collectively with their employers. By agreement with the ARU and New 
South Wales, ACT and Queensland rugby unions (the "Ferrier Agreement") the players were to earn 
95% of the News Agreement revenues and have representation on the boards of the rugby unions. The 
rugby unions were to support and fund the establishment of a players union for senior and age grade 
players and not discriminate in any way against players who had signed for WRC. The Ferrier 
Agreement was later replaced by a collective contract which left the players with a significant 
percentage of total revenues and Board representation. The Ferrier Agreement is still proudly displayed 
on the Australian Rugby Union Players Association (ARUPA) website at 
http://www.rupa.com.au/images/Ferrier-Agreement.gif (last accessed 11 November 2003. Braham 
Dabscheck reports, in 'Sport, Human Rights and Industrial Relations" (2000) AJ HR 23 footnote 87 
available athttp://www.worldlii.org/cgi-worldlii/disp.pl/au/journals/ AJ HR/2000/23.html (last accessed 
22 August 2003, that once WRC had been seen off the players union had to take court action to 
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IV THE CURRENT EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS OF NEW 
ZEALAND RUGBY PLAYERS 
A The Players Union- the Collective and RUPA 
The Rugby Players Collective Incorporated (the "players union") is an incorporated 
society registered under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 and registered trade 
union under the provisions of the Employment Relations Act 2000.66 
The players umon 1s not the same body as the Rugby Union Players 
Association Incorporated (RUPA) that opposed the NZRFU's NPC Transfer 
Regulations before the Commerce Commission and appealed the Commissions 
decision to the High Court in 1997.67 RUPA continued to function after losing the 
1997 case but was rejuvenated by the Employment Relations Act 2000 (or in fact the 
reality that it was to become law). RUPA functions alongside the Players Collective 
with similar membership and management. The NZRFU funds RUPA but does not 
fund the Players Collective.68 
B The Collective Contracts 
preserve its position and that after an initial procedural victory for the players union a collective 
agreement was negotiated. The ARU/ARUPA Collective Barga ining Agreement (CBA) provides that 
players covered by it (Super 12 and International players) a minimum wage of A$47,500, few to no 
restrictions on sponsorship arrangements, requires players to have medical insurance with the ARU 
topping up the shortfall between what the players private fund pays and the actual cost and a death 
benefit of A$ I million . While there is no guarantee against state rugby unions in so lvency the ARU has 
been willing to bail out state unions, such as New South Wales, in the past - Brent Reed "RL:Rugby 
Union players chief can understand RLPAfrustration" AAP Newsfeed September 5 2003 
https://www. nexi s (last accessed 9 September 2003). 
66 Section 15 Employment Relations Act 2000 
67 Rugby Union Playe rs · Association Inc v Commerce Commission ( No 2) [ 1997 J 3 NZLR 30 I 
68 Section 14 ( I) (d) Employment Relations Act 2000 requires that in order to be registered a society 
must be" independent of, and is constituted and operates at arm's length from, any employer." 
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All the players that play professional rugby in New Zealand today are meant 
to be employed to play rugby union under one of two collective employment contracts 
negotiated between the players union and New Zealand Rugby Promotions Limited 
(NZRPL), the NZRFU and representatives of the New Zealand provincial rugby 
unions in 2001.69 The agreements came into force on January l 2002 and expire on 31 
December 2004. 
The NZRFU decided in 2000 that it was in its interests to support the players 
desire to reinvigorate their players association and provided significant funding to 
enable the association to better establish itself and obtain legal and other advice 
independent of the NZRFU.70 What were to become the objects of the Employment 
Relations Act 2000 stated in Section 3(a)7 1 sat well with the professional rugby union 
69 RUPA's contention that eventually "the NZRFU and RUPA would follow the trend evident overseas 
whereby the players association and the governing body agree a uniform collective contract, which 
itself regulates all aspects of the sport, including the transfer of players" in Rugby Union Players 
Association Inc v Co111111erce Co111111ission ( No2) ( 1997) 3 NZLR 30 I, 318 has so far proved right in 
relation to the collective contract but the inclusion of the transfer of players and other regulations is yet 
to be achieved. Two cases involving the Auckland Rugby Football Union (ARFU) suggest that the 
ARFU, in breach of its obligations under the Participation Agreements, is continuing to offer players 
contracts framed as contracts of service. See Waikato Rugby Union ( Inc) v New Zealand Rugby 
Football Union ( Inc) Unreported Employment Court decision (WC46/02; WRC 37/02) Wellington 12 
November 2002; 10 December 2002 Judge C M Shaw and Auckland Rugby Football Union v ACC 
unreported District Court decision of March 2003 
70 While the funding link obviously brings with it the possibility of the appearance of a lack of 
independence the context suggests otherwise. There was no rival association or trade union seeking to 
establish itself. The players association had already elected its Board and employed its management 
before the NZRFU was approached for funding. The association and the NZRFU began work together 
on a major area of concern to the players and the NZRFU namely the lack of any preparation, guidance 
or advice for professional player's life outside the game. This resulted in the appointment of five 
professional development mangers who oversee the professional development program for all New 
Zealand's professional players. The New Zealand Rugby Union Players Association which is funded 
by the NZRFU is not the body the players have registered as their union the New Zealand Rugby 
Union Players Collective. This body receives no funding form the NZRFU. 
71 "to build productive employment relationships through the promotion of mutual trust and 
confidence in all aspects of the employment environment and of the employment relationship---
(i) by recognising that employment relationships must be built on good faith behaviour; 
and 
(ii) by acknowledging and addressing the inherent inequality of bargaining power in 
employment relationships; and 
(iii) by promoting collective bargaining; and 
(iv) by protecting the integrity of individual choice; and 
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environment that the NZRFU and the players union wanted m New Zealand. The 
negotiations began before the Jaw was passed. 
The NZRFU's objective was to agree a single form of collective agreement 
that would cover all players at all levels at which players were paid to play. It was not 
the initial intention that there be a single employer but the need for one became 
apparent as the parties struggled with the need to deal with the nature of the game 
where overlapping international and national competition windows meant a player 
could be in one team one week under the control of one union playing in a 
competition controlled by another governing body and the next week be in a new 
team under a different union in a competition controlled by another governing body .
72 
(v) by promoting mediation as the primary problem solving mechanism; and 
b1 reducing the need for judicial intervention; ..... " 7- In the course of 2003 the same professional rugby player employed by NZRPL might have been 
employed to play rugby union in the following competitions, places and teams: 
In the IRB International Sevens Series tournament in Wellington and around the world 
under the IRB's disciplinary rules, for the sevens series, in New Zealand administered by 
the NZRFU and elsewhere by other national unions on behalf of the IRB, as a member of 
the New Zealand Sevens team managed by the NZRFU. 
In the Super 12 played in New Zealand, South Africa and Australia under the SANZAR 
disciplinary rules, relating to the Super 12, administered by the national union in whose 
jurisdiction the match is played, as a member of a New Zealand Super 12 franchises team 
managed by the provincial union holding the Super 12 management agreement for the 
Super 12 franchise. 
In the inbound (Tri-Nations and other matches) tests played in New Zealand and in tests 
in South Africa and Australia, under the IRB's disciplinary rules , administered by the 
Host Union on behalf of the !RB, as an All Black managed by the ZRFU. 
In club rugby matches under the disciplinary rules of the provincial rugby union as a 
member of the senior men's club team managed by his club 
In the NPC played in New Zealand under the NZRFU's disciplinary rules as a member of 
a provincial team managed by the provincial rugby union . 
In the Rugby World Cup in Australia under the IRB 's Rugby World Cup Disciplinary 
rules as an All Black managed by the ZRFU. 
In an international age grade representative competition under the IRB's disciplinary rules 
as a member of a New Zealand national representative team managed by the NZRFU 
In any other year the player could also have toured Europe as an All Black or as a member of another 
national team and would be subject to disciplinary procedures of IRB conducted by the national rugby 
union of the place in which the match took place. 
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The parties also wanted a single forn1 of contract to cover all levels of 
professional play to minimise confusion for players and administrators alike. It was 
eventually decided that two contracts with a single employer, NZRPL, were 
preferable in order to keep the contract for players playing below national sevens and 
Super 12 level as simple as possible while maintaining a relationship with the other 
collective contract. The NZRFU would put NZRPL in funds to pay the national team 
and Super 12 payments and the provinces would put NZRPL in funds to pay the 
provincial team payments. Neither the provinces nor the NZRFU would be privy to 
the others payments.73 
The process was lengthy because many of the issues were being addressed for 
the first time but also because the NZRFU had to negotiate at the same time new 
participation agreements with all twenty seven provincial rugby unions as a result of 
the changes being proposed in the collective contracts.
74 Provincial union 
representatives made up part of the employers negotiating team. 
The establishment at the outset of seven guiding principles together with the 
good faith bargaining principles set out in the Employment Relations Act 2003 
materially assisted the negotiation process.75 
73 The NZRFU does not insist as IRB regulations require it to that a copy of every players contract is 
filed with it because it wants to be free from any suggestion that it provides one province with 
information about what another province is paying a player. 
74 At the same time the NZRFU was putting in place new generally accepted rugby union financial 
accounting practices and standards (GA RAP) and a requirement for performance agreements to be 
executed by the NZRFU and each provinces setting out clear performance targets for teams, 
competitions, development and governance and finance. By gaining clarity and accountability for 
national and provincial union performance it was hoped that players, clubs and other stakeholders 
would be able to see how money was flowing from the professional game to the foundational levels of 
the sport. 
75 The seven guiding principles are that the players and the employer will: 
" . . .. work as a TEAM to ensure that Rugby in New Zealand: 
,.,,., 
.).) 
The agreements set out all key terms of employment except length of term and 
compensation, which are individually negotiated. There are minimum levels of salary 
set for players who agree to three or more year term contracts.
76 NZRPL is agreed to 
be the only employer of players employed to play rugby for the NZRFU or it 
provinces.77 Players are seconded by NZRPL to the NZRFU or the player's provincial 
union or Super 12 franchise during the course of the rugby season as the player moves 
from team to team. 
There is no requirement that players must be members of the collective to be 
employed by NZRPL but the form of offer that must be used ensures players are 
informed of the Collective Agreement; of the existence of the players union; given a 
copy of the Players Handbook (which contains all player union contact details); 
advised that if they are members of the union the contract will cover them upon 
acceptance and if they are not they are covered for thirty days to decide whether to 
l. exceeds the expectations of fans by providing them with the highest quality players, 
competitions and entertainment; 
2. regognises the important role of Broadcasters and the mutual value we create in bringing 
the game to the fans, by providing Broadcasters with exciting Rugby and related content 
which enhances the value of Rugby; 
3. regognises the importance of Sponsors who support our game( because their customers 
are our fans) by working with Sponsors to ensure our fans value the support Sponsors 
give rugby; 
4. creates an environment in which all players, at all levels, have the opportunity to reach 
their potential and, for those who excel, the opportunity to develop a successful and 
rewarding career by developing sound competition structures and appropriate coaching 
and development programs; 
5. respects, supports and encourages Rugby's volunteers by recognising their contribution to 
the game of Rugby and actively supporting their efforts in clubs and schools throughout 
New Zealand; 
6. achieves long term financial stability and success through the effective development, 
promotion and delivery of Rugby; and 
7. recognises the need for a safe Rugby environment by taking a proactive and through 
approach to health and safety at all levels of the game." 
76 Schedule B # l Collective Contract sets the minimum Super 12 (including NPC availability) at 
$65,000 and the minimum All Black payment at $85,000. 
77 Clause 4.1 of both Collective Agreements 
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JOm the players union; are encouraged to contact the umon. If they then join the 
union they are covered. If they don't they need to meet with the employer to discuss 
an employment contract. 
C The Players Acceptance of IRB rules and regulation 
The New Zealand professional rugby player has a direct contractual 
relationship with NZRPL by virtue of the Collective Contracts and with his club by 
virtue of registration and membership . The player has agreed to "comply with all 
applicable IRB rules and regulations in force from time to time, summaries of which 
are contained in the Players Handbook." 78 
D The anti-trust exemption for restraints agreed in employment contracts 
The Commerce Commission has no jurisdiction to consider the anti 
competitive effects of employment contracts as employment contracts are explicitly 
excluded from the definition of services in the Commerce Act 1986.
79 
This provides the employers and the employees in New Zealand rugby the 
opportunity to agree labour market restraints that are exempt from the Commerce Act. 
There is no need for the NZRFU to go through the authorisation process as it did in 
1996. This exemption is similar to the ant-trust exemption the National Football 
League and the National Football League Players Association and a number of other 
professional sports organisers and player unions have in the United States albeit on a 
78 The Players Handbook simply refers the player to the IRB website for a list of the Bye-laws and 
regulations so it can be assumed that the players have accepted they are bound by all the IRB Bye-laws 
and regulations. 
79 Section 2( l) and 3 ( l A) Commerce Act 1986 
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different basis. The basis of the exemption 1s statutory one m New Zealand and a 
common law one in the United States.so 
Any restraints agreed in the context of a collective agreement would still be 
subject to the common law doctrine of restraint of trade but is likely that the fact that 
such restrictions were freely negotiated in a statutory collective bargaining process 
will give such restraints greater likelihood of withstanding judicial scrutiny if attacked 
as an unreasonable restraint compared to restraints imposed unilaterally by regulation. 
The very fact they negotiated will help ensure that they are more reasonable. 
Given the stated intentions of the Employment Relations Act 2000 regarding 
employment relationships and collective bargaining and given the fact that it will be 
the Employment Court that will be determining the reasonableness of any restraint the 
chances of a collectively bargained restraint being allowed are high.s
1 The court will 
need to make a determination as to whether it is possible for a player to be anything 
other than an employee in New Zealand rugby in order to gain exclusive jurisdiction 
on the issue of restraints of trade.s
2 If the Authority or Court decided that the only 
80 Similar statutory exemptions exist in the Trade Practices Act in Australia but there is no similar 
exemption in Europe. 
81 The Employment Authority and the Employment Court would certainly have exclusive jurisdiction 
to determine the reasonableness of any collectively negotiated restraint pursuant to sections 161 and 
187 Employment Relations Act 2000. The Court and the Authority have the exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine whether a person is an "employee" or not under Section 6 Employment Relations Act 2000 
pursuant to Sections 161 (I) (c) and 187 (f) of the Act. The Authority and Courts jurisdiction is not 
limited to the employment contract but to make determinations about "employment relations generally" 
including pursuant to Section 161 (I) (r) any other action arising from or related to an employment 
relationship. See Waikato Rugby Union ( Inc) v New Zealand Rugby Football Union (Inc) Unreported 
Employment Court decision (WC46/02; WRC 37/02) Wellington 12 ovember 2002; 10 December 
2002 Judge C M Shaw 
82 It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter the debate about whether any particular player could 
make a case that his relationship with the rugby union he played for was not an employment 
relationship. It is the author's view that the player would have to have negotiated exceptional levels of 
personal control rugby unions are unlikely to want to relinquish in order to have any case at all. The 
fact that the sole employers of players, the national and provincial unions have all agreed the 
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possible arrangement was an employment relationship and that the collective 
bargaining agreement had been fairly and freely negotiated it would be entitled to 
assume for example that the employees covered by the agreement (currently all 
players playing in New Zealand) agreed that the restraints were in the best interests of 
the game and the players. This would add weight to the employer's case for the 
restraint. It would not prohibit a player who was not a member of the union claiming 
a restraint was unreasonable but the court in considering whether that was the case 
would be entitled to take notice of the fact that the players in the union believed it was 
reasonable. 
For this reason it is very much in the interests of the employer and the 
employee to agree any labour market restraints in the collective contract. Such 
restraints could reasonably include transfer restraints, salary caps and revenue sharing 
agreements (including specification of a fixed percentage of revenue required to be 
spent the development of the game). 
V THE RUGBY MONOLITH- A.K.A. JAWS 
A The monolithic rugby union employers system 
relationship is usually an employment relationship also means that player would need to demonstrate 
something very different about the nature of his arrangement from that of his team mates. In any event 
it now only requires a simple request for a determination on application (under section 6 Employment 
Relations Act 2000) of status by the Employment Authority to decide the issue. 
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In Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd.83 Justice Wilberforce ( as 
he then was) described soccer's then international and national system of governance 
as follows84 : 
"The system is an employers' system, set up in an industry where the employers have 
succeeded in setting up a monolithic front all over the world, and where it is clear for the 
purpose of negotiation the employers are vastly more strongly organised than the employees. 
No doubt the employers all over the world consider the system a good system, but this does 
not prevent the court from considering whether it goes further than is reasonably necessary to 
protect their legitimate interests." 
Rugby unions system today is perhaps even more monolithic than the system 
Justice Wilberforce confronted in 1966. In each of the countries in which it is played 
rugby unions governing bodies have established regulatory, disciplinary and 
commercial monopolies over the governance of the sport in their nation. 
Ninety four unions are joined together by contract as members of the 
International Rugby Board (IRB). Only twelve85 of those national unions have any 
direct control over the governance of the IRB. Eight86 of those unions voting together 
can change the rules and regulations of the IRB and any three unions of those eight 
unions, voting together, can block any change to the IRB's regulations and rules.87 
83 
[ 1964] Ch 413 
84 Eastham 438 
85 Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, England, Scotland, Wales, France, Ireland, Argentina, Japan, 
Italy and Canada 
86 Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, England, Scotland, Wales, France and Ireland 
87 From an economic and playing performance perspective five national unions (England, France, 
Australia, South Africa and ew Zealand) could control the game but the three Celtic unions have been 
skilful at using their position a foundation IRB unions with s ix votes to entrench and consolidate their 
economically privileged position often aided and abetted by New Zealand and France. 
38 
Ten88 of those unions control all of the professional rugby union competitions in the 
world. 
The depth of the rugby monopoly is deeper than the professional American 
sports leagues because collectively the rugby bodies control every aspect of the sport 
not simply a single level of competition. The monopoly is both horizontal like the 
American sports and vertical like soccer except enhanced because of the 
concentration of political and economic power in the eight controlling unions. 
An understanding of the full nature and extent of the monolith is essential to 
understanding the strength and power of the employers compared to the employee in 
international rugby . The professional players - the employees -find themselves 
dealing with an international and national cartel - a cartel that sincerely believes that 
it is a benevolent cartel- but a cartel nonetheless. It is a cartel of national unions each 
of which is able to play the players off like some sort of chameleon which blames the 
IRB for restrictions the players object to while always in fact actually being the IRB. 
Its rules and regulations equally restrict the ability of anyone, including one of the 
national unions, to organise an alternative competition or match without the 
permission of the IRB . 
The primacy of the IRB' s tournaments and the international rugby matches 
organised between national rugby unions over other levels of rugby union such as 
English club or New Zealand provincial rugby is guaranteed by the IRB's Bye-laws 
88 Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, England, Scotland, Wales, France, Ireland, Italy and Japan 
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and regulations. This was explained in the English context, referring to the attempts of 
the English professional clubs to control their own economic destiny, as follows:
89 
"Perhaps the main feature that has made the birth of club rugby more difficult is that the 
regulations of the fRB specifically guarantee the primacy of the international game. !RB 
regulations effectively grant Unions a monopoly over commercialisation of all levels of the 
sport. What is more , the Unions can call on players for international matches and training as 
often as they wish with the consequent disruption to the club playing season. 
These !RB regulations (which allow unions to combine regulatory and commercial functions) 
enabled the Rugby Football Union to "bundle" the sale of broadcasting rights for club and 
international games in England in the well known agreement with Sky. The agreement 
basically provided that in return for a quarter of the revenues , clubs would release their 
players for international games. 
EFDR is very concerned with regard to the expansionist policy of the !RB. New !RB 
regulations now have encroached into the governance and commercial affairs of clubs . 
Governance of clubs has always been and should continue to be the jurisdiction of the national 
union. 
The !RB continue to practice and expand international regulations which are flagrantly in 
breach of European law." 
These regulations which are made without any consultation or negotiation 
with professional players can both limit the ability of players to earn their living from 
the game and make them subject to sanction if they are in breach of the regulations. 
89 "Me111orandu111 submitted by English First Division Rugby" to House of Commons Select 
Committee on Culture, Media and Sport Minutes of Evidence paragraphs 1.14 and 1.15 and 6.5 and 6.6 
available at http://www .publications.parliament (last accessed 4 September 2003) 
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The potential supply side monopoly of an international rugby union in relation 
to international rugby union matches was recognised in Australian Rugby Union Ltd v 
Hospitality Group9°where Gyles J ruled: 
"There is no suggestion that anyone else apart from the ARU can produce international rugby 
test matches in Australia in the foreseeable future. It also effectively controls the provincial 
unions." And: 
" .. it is perfectly obvious that the ARU has dominant market power in any market limited to 
international rugby test matches. It controls event admission and the event." 
The ARU and other national rugby unions also have demand side monopsony 
power in the employment of players to play international rugby. In New Zealand the 
NZRFU, via NZRPL, centrally contracts all Super 12 players as well as international 
players. A separate New Zealand market "for the provision and acquisition of 
premier rugby union player services" was defined by the Commerce Commission in 
1996.91 While NZRPL contracts players to play in provincial unions to play at NPC 
level the NZRFU contributes significant funding to enable players to pay NPC 
9" rugby. -
90 [2000] FCA 823 per Gyles J para 84 and 89. The situation in New Zealand is the same with the 
NZRFU controlling the international team and the international competitions and Super 12 competition 
and franchises. It is also true at international level every where else the professional game is played that 
the national union has monopoly control of the international matches played in its market and of 
selection of players for national teams. In New Zealand, lreland and Scotland players are contracted by 
the national union to play in the Super 12, Celtic League or European Cup. Gyles J's comments related 
the supply of international rugby hospitality where the supply side of the relevant market was bigger 
than rugby union matches. In England the professional clubs receive significant funding from the 
English Rugby Union. 
91 New Zealand Commerce Commission Decision 281 17 December 1996 , 16, para 72 "Premier 
players" are defined as players playing or nominated as All Blacks, Super 12, NPC, NPC Development 
players, New Zealand under 21 or under 19 or New Zealand Secondary schools (see para 71). This 
would equate to around 1330 players ( 1.1 % of the players registered to play in New Zealand in 2003) 
in any year only 150 (0.13%)of whom would be full time professional players. 
92 $ I 5,000 of a players Super 12 contract is paid to make himself available for NPC rugby for his 
province. In addition the NZRFU pays significant extra funding to NPC division one provinces to 
enable them to contract players and coaches. 
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B The International Rugby Board (IRB) 
1 The IRB's constitutional structure and membership 
The IRB is an unincorporated body resident in Ireland. Its Bye-laws constitute 
a contract between the members to be bound by its Bye-laws and Regulations.
93 Its 
Bye-laws provide that English law will govern the IRB's Bye-laws and regulations 
and any disputes are subject to the jurisdiction of the English courts.
94 
The IRB is the supreme regulator of the game (although by virtue of its 
membership of the Olympic Movement it is subject to the Olympic Charter). It 
determines the laws of the game and the regulations that govern the management of 
the sport. 
While it has 94 members most of its members have no voting rights at the IRB 
Council which is the key decision making body. Nor is there any process for the 
democratic election of the IRB Council by the wider membership. On the IRB 
Council the larger unions have disproportionately high voting rights . Only England, 
Scotland, Ireland, Wales, South Africa , France , Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 
Canada, Argentina, Italy and the European regional rugby federation (AER) have 
voting rights. The English, Welsh, Irish, Scottish, French, New Zealand, Australian 
and South African unions have two votes each . The others have a single vote each. 
European unions, directly or indirectly, have 12 of 21 votes and the two vote unions 
have 16 of 21 votes. Changes in the IRB Bye-laws or regulations require 16 votes so 
the two vote unions can make any change they like if they vote together and any three 
91 IRB Bye-law 7 
94 IRB Bye-law 10 
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of them voting together can block any change. In New Zealand rugby terms it is 
equivalent to the NPC first division unions having all the votes with total 
disenfranchisement of the rest of New Zealand rugby. 
There is no logic, except the protection of financial privilege and political 
power, for either the continued exclusion of nations such as Fiji, Western Samoa, 
Tonga and the United States whose playing strength is at least as strong as some the 
nations that have IRB Council votes or in the inclusion of the European federation and 
not Asia, Oceania, Africa and the Americas. 
2 IRB Tournaments and other commercial activity 
Since 1987 the IRB has involved itself (via a number of subsidiaries or special 
purpose entities) in major commercial activity. The most significant commercial 
activity of the IRB is the Rugby World Cup. It also organises the Sevens World Cup 
and Series, the Women's World Cup and age grade tournaments. 
3 IRB's direct contractual relationships with professional players 
The only direct contractual relationship that arises between the IRB and New 
Zealand professional players is when the IRB organises the international age grade 
and Seven a side tournaments or at the Rugby World Cup. On those occasions the 
IRB insists that the players (professional or otherwise) sign participation agreements 
in relation to the IRB tournament submitting to the rules of the tournament, the 
disciplinary and anti doping rules and assigning various player image rights to the 
43 
IRB. Professional players are paid to play in these tournaments by their national 
unions under their employment or service contracts. 
The recent controversy between players associations and national rugby 
unions m relation the IRB demand that players sign the RWC 2003 participation 
agreement was founded, among other things, on the fact that the IRB was seeking 
significantly greater rights for the use of a players personal image than the unions had 
negotiated with the players unions. The IRB and the national unions refused to allow 
the IRB to get directly involved with the players insisting that it was a matter between 
employer and employee and not between the IRB and the players. The players 
understandably wanted to engage the IRB as the party they were being expected to 
contract with. Alternatively they might have expected to have been fully consulted 
before their national unions signed participation agreements committing the players to 
sign a form of participation agreement. 
4 IRB Bye-laws and Regulations 
(a) IRB Bye-laws 
The IRB Bye-laws are the fundamental constitutional document of the IRB, 
subject only to the submission to the Olympic Charter through the IRB's membership 
on the Olympic Movement. The Bye-laws contain the powers and objectives of the 
IRB. They place all the IRB's powers in the hands of the IRB Council.
95The 
objectives of the IRB are96 to promote, foster, develop and extend rugby; to make the 
95 IRB Bye-law 2 
96 IRB Bye-law 3 In the judgement of Justice Casey in Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union 
Inc ( No2) [ 1985) 2 NZLR 18 I, I 84 the equivalent provision in the then NZRFU constitution to the IRB 
objective of "promoting, fostering, developing, extending and governing the Game" was held to be "the 
fundamental reason for the Union's existence, and all the other objects relate to ways in which rugby 
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Bye-laws, regulations and laws of rugby union; to settle disputes between national 
unions; to regulate the schedule of matches between the senior representative sides of 
Council Member unions to ensure there is a fair and equitable schedule;
97 and 
preventing disc1imination on the basis of sex, race, religion or political affiliations. 
Bye-law 4 was inserted to make clear that players could be paid to play and it 
provides that the IRB may make regulations which are binding on all unions and their 
constituent bodies. In the New Zealand context this means that the IRB Regulations 
are binding on the NZRFU, the provincial rugby unions and Whakapumautanga. They 
do not directly bind clubs or players98 . National Unions can make more restrictive 
regulations provided they do not conflict with the IRB regulations. Bye-law 5 
provides that the Laws of the Game will be binding and uniform and will be observed 
in all matches. 
Bye-law 7 states: 
"Membership of the Board by a Union or Association shall be effective as an 
agreement binding suc h Union or Association (which agreement requires 
such Union or Association to similarly by agreement bind its affiliated 
membership which such Union or Association undertakes to do) to abide by 
the Bye-Laws, Regulations and Laws of the Game and to accept and enforce 
all the Board' s decisions (unless and until revoked or set aside by the Council) 
can be controlled, promoted, fostered or developed as appropriate to the circumstances involved." The 
objects of the NZRFU were to be read as a whole. The NZRFU tried to rely on the object in its then 
constitution relating to the organisation of international matches but this was rejected as that object was 
held to be read with reference to the others. The NZRFU constitution was altered after the decision so 
that it was clear that each object and power was independent of the others. 
97 The reference to "Council member unions" makes manifest the entrenchment of the privilege 
attached to Council membership. The !RB have also not themselves regarded the requirement of 
fairness and equity to take into account anything other than fairness and equity in the sense of 
reciprocity of matches - that if we play you then you will play us. Issues such as the burden this 
imposes on some nations (Fiji for example) and the financial benefit gained by other nations(England 
for example) are simply ignored as not relevant to a fair and equitable schedule. Rugby union was 
organised for most of its existence without the !RB needing this power. This power was first asserted in 
the years immediately after professionalism and in particular after England and the English clubs had 
threatened the structure of European rugby by seeking extra matches against the SANZAR nations and 
seeking to make its own broadcasting arrangements in relation to the Six Nations. 




in respect of the playing and/or administration of the Game throughout the 
country or countries within the jurisdiction of such Union or Association. 
Any breach of this agreement or any conduct which may be prejudicial to the 
interests of the Board or of the Game shall render such Union or Association 
liable to disciplinary action in accordance with Regulation 18 of the Regulations 
Relating to the Game." 
By its membership of the IRB the NZRFU agrees to abide by the IRB Bye-
laws, Regulations and Laws of the Game. All other IRB members are similarly bound 
thereby making the IRB rugby unions' supreme governing body.99 
IRB Bye-law 10 (b) provides: 
"These Bye-Laws and any Regulations Relating to the Game, General 
Regulations or Laws of the Game made pursuant thereto shall in all 
respects be governed by and construed in accordance with English 
Law, and any dispute arising there under shall be subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Engli sh Courts." 
As the common law doctrine of restraint of trade is the same in New Zealand 
and England this governing law clause does not improve or diminish a New Zealand 
players rights. It is also very clear that the NZRFU has submitted to the jurisdiction of 
the English courts in relation to disputes arising under the IRB Bye-laws or 
regulations. There is an issue as to whether the players by agreeing to comply with 
"applicable IRB rules and regulations" have submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
99 see discussion of NZRFU constitution for the constitutional links between the NZRFU and its 
members (the provincial unions and Whakapumautanga) and the IRB. 
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English courts. In relation to a dispute between NZRPL as employer and a player or 
the players union the New Zealand Employment Court has exclusive jurisdiction. 
Waikato Rugby Union (Inc) v New Zealand Rugby Football Union (Inc) 
100shows that 
the Employment Court is prepared to assert its jurisdiction to include the participation 
agreements which relate to the employment relationship. It is not a big step to assert 
jurisdiction over the bye-laws and regulations that equally affect the employment 
relationship. 
The most sensible approach would be for a player to seek a declaration in the 
English courts. if it is the IRB bye law or regulation the player is seeking to attack 
because the IRB will be unable to ignore the declaration of the English court or 
dispute jurisdiction as it might be tempted to do otherwise. 
The appeal to the English courts may have the potentially added benefit of 
bringing the European Convention on Human Rights and the provisions of the 
European Treaty on freedom of movement of workers into play in determining how 
the IRB's Bye-laws and regulations are to be governed and construed. The court 
might be forced to acknowledge that the rule or regulation in so far as it applied to 
movement of workers in Europe or the rights guaranteed under the European 
Convention was unlawful. In much the same way as the Bosman decision caused the 
IRB to amend its transfer rules to comply with European law the IRB would be forced 
to similarly amend any offending Bye-law or regulation with a vicarious benefit for 
New Zealand players. 
100 unreported Employment Court Wellington ( WC46/02; WRC37/02) 12 November 2002; JO 
December 2002 Judge C M Shaw 
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(b) IRB Regulations Relating to the Game (the IRB Regulations) 
These regulations directly affect the employment environment for players 
primarily because they do not generally relate to the game so much as the commercial 
aspects of the game. Most of the commercially oriented regulations were not 
promulgated until after players were paid to play. Others were a direct response to the 
possibility of competition for national unions particularly from the professional 
English clubs. The regulations restrict the ability of players to be employed to play 
and also restrict the establishment of alternative matches or competitions by players, 
players' organisations or anyone else not sanctioned by the IRB or the relevant 
national union. 
The IRB Regulations continue the process begun in the bye-laws of 
connecting the whole rugby union pyramid under the ultimate control of the IRB. 
National unions must comply with the IRB Regulations and are compelled to ensure 
that their members are similarly bound. 101 Provincial rugby unions are, as members of 
the NZRFU, said to be bound by the IRB bye laws and regulations 102and can only be 
affiliated to one national and only have one home ground . They must affiliate to the 
national union in whose territory the home ground is. 103 The effect of this is to divide 
the rugby world up into exclusive territories. Before the game went professional in 
1996 the reason for this was largely to do with orderly administration and disciplinary 
process but after professionalism regulations have been added which effectively stop 
101 !RB Regulation 2. 1.1 
102 see comments following on the NZRFU and provincial union structure to see how the NZRFU 
constitution, Provincial Union constitution, participation agreements, club constitutions and the player 
regisLration process link both players and rugby bodies into the pyramid 
t03 !RB Regulation 2. 1.2 
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any one within the rugby structure from exploiting commercial rights without the 
permission of the IRB and/or their national union. 
(c) IRB Regulations of Player Movement, Contracts and Status 
The IRB regulations on player movement were substantially altered in an 
attempt to avoid the consequences of the Bosman104 decision which held UEFA's 
transfer regulations to breach the provisions of the European Treaty protecting the 
freedom of movement of workers within the European Union. The IRB regulations 
were, up until they were changed, very similar to the soccer regulations that fell foul 
of the decision of the European Court of Justice in Bosman. The fact that the 
regulations were changed is indicative of the sensitivity of the regulation of rugby 
union to European law because of the Eurocentric nature of the sport. The IRB is 
unusual among international governing bodies in basing its headquarters within the 
European Union and is also unusual in that the IRB Council is dominated by 
European rugby unions and associations. 105 The effect of this is that New Zealand 
players benefit from the vicarious application of European law as the NZRFU must 
follow the IRB's lead. They do not obtain the rights to freedom of movement of 
workers within the European Union that nearly all of their international player 
104 Case C-415/93 U11io11 Royale Beige des Socities de Football Ass '11 v Jean Marc Bosman ( December 
15 1995) ( 1996) I CMLR 645 ("the Bosman case") 
105 The IOC and FIFA are based in Switzerland. The IAAF is based in Monaco. European national 
rugby unions and the European rugby federation have 12 of the 21 IRB Council votes and the lRB is 
based within the European Union in Dublin and by agreement of the members who constitute it subject 
to English law and the jurisdiction of the English courts. 
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counterparts have106 but they do gain a much less restrictive international and 
domestic transfer scheme than might otherwise have been the case. 
The IRB regulations are stated to apply to movement of players between 
national unions. 107 In fact the effect of the IRB Regulations may be that they apply to 
player movement at all levels of rugby union. Each national union is required to 
provide its own system for movement of players within its jurisdiction, by regulation, 
which is to be registered with the IRB. 108 The national union regulations must include 
the IRB Regulations and must observe the general principles of the IRB regulation.
109 
Further IRB Regulation 4.7 which relates to compensation for development of players 
rather than movement or status of players appears on its face to apply to movement at 
all levels of rugby union. 
Professional players must have a written agreement in a form approved by the 
national union. 110 The contract must be agreed not imposed and be for a fixed 
period. 111 A copy of that agreement is to be provided to the national union and to the 
IRB if demanded by the IRB. 1120nly players that are registered with a national union 
can play in competitions organised or sanctioned by that union.
113Players can only be 
registered with one national union. 114 Registration is important because only a 
registered professional player is a "contract player" for the purposes of the 
106 Players who are European Union citizens or whose country (such as South Africa and the Pacific 
Island nations) has entered into an agreement with the European Union providing its citizens with 
similar rights to European workers if working in Europe gain the benefit of the European Treaty 
firotection of the freedom of movement of workers and anti-discrimination provisions. 
07 !RB Regulation 4.2 
108 IRB Regulation 4.3 
109 !RB Regulation 4.4 
110 !RB Regulation 4.5. l (c) In New Zealand the Collective Contract meets this requirement. 
111 !RB Regulation 4.5.2 
112 IRB Regulation 4.5.2 
113 IRB Regulation 4.4.3 "registered' means directly or indirectly via province or club. 
114 IRB Regulation4.5.4 
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regulation. 115 All other players including unregistered professional players are defined 
as non-contract players. Each national union is required to maintain a register of 
"contract players". If a professional player leaves a national union's jurisdiction he or 
she will not be regarded as a "contract player" unless registered. 116 A player who is a 
contract player retains that status for twelve months after their last match.
117 
The IRB Regulations on player movement between national unions 118 prohibit 
the registration of a player unless that player is first cleared by the national union 
where he or she is currently registered. The effect of the process is to deregister the 
player in his or her previous national union so that the player can be registered in the 
new national union. The clearance form must be signed by both the union with whom 
a player is registered and by "the union for whom the player is entitled to play in 
international matches." 119 The players current union must clear the player unless the 
player is subject to suspension (unless the suspension is for less than five weeks and 
the new union has agreed to enforce it) or· has not met contractual obligations to the 
players current union. 1 :'°The effect of the regulations is to provide few grounds for the 
restraint of movement of players. The regulations are silent on the grounds on which 
115 !RB Regulation 4.5.4 
116 The NZRFU maintains a database of all registered players. The registration system is school and 
club based. The constitution and regulations of each of the provincial unions mandates that all players 
be registered. The NZRFU also maintains a register of all contract players contracted by it and NZRPL 
pays all contracted players in ew Zealand. In order to fully comply with this regulation the NZRFU 
needs to establish a register of players contracted by provincial unions and require copies of the 
contracts to be provided to the NZRFU pursuant to !RB Regulation 4.5.2. The incentive for provincial 
unions is that players are not "Contract Players" for the purposes of the !RB Regulations unless 
retstered with the national union. 
11 !RB Regulation 4.8.1 
118 !RB Regulation 4.6 
119 see definition of "clearance" in the IRB Regulation. In practice unless a player has played for a third 
party national union the IRB's eligibility regulations mean that this definition could require multiple 
unions to sign a clearance. With eligibility coming from birth and ancestry it is entirely possible for a 
player to be eligible to play for five different rugby nations. The intent of the regulation is probably to 
require the clearance of a national union a player has actually played for rather than all those unions a 
P:layer might play for. 
20 IRB Regulations 4.6.3, 4.6.4 and 4.6.5 
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the union for which the player is entitled to play interna,tional matches could object to 
clearance of a player Such a union would find it difficult to justify a refusal to sign a 
clearance other than on grounds similar to those on which the players current union 
was able to refuse. 
IRB Regulation 4.7 provides a comprehensive code for compensation for 
player development for New Zealand players who are professional on or out of 
contract and amateur players who leave New Zealand to take up a contract outside 
New Zealand. It is heavily influenced by the factors that the European Court of 
Justice stated could reasonably be included in a "transfer fee" in Bosman and by the 
soccer transfer regulations that followed that decision . 
The NZRFU's internal transfer system is at odds with the IRB external 
transfer system. The NZRFU system provides for a series of payment levels or 
transfer bands based on the level of team the player has played in rather than the costs 
incurred in developing the player. Given the NZRFU's agreement, by membership of 
the IRB, to conform to the IRB' s regulations it is clear that to the extent that the 
NZRFU' s transfer regulations are inconsistent with the IRB Regulation the IRB 
regulation governs. The Provincial Unions that are members of the NZRFU are also 
bound to comply with the IRB Regulations by virtue of their participation agreements 
with the NZRFU and any rule or regulation of such provinces which conflicts with the 
IRB regulations is deemed to be inoperative by Rule 5.3 of the NZRFU Constitution. 
The calculation of "development compensation" in the IRB Regulation is likely to 
lead to payment of sums considerably smaller than the payments made under the 
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NZRFU transfer regulations. This will mean there is an incentive for New Zealand 
players to move offshore rather than transfer within New Zealand. 
Professional players who are still contracted by a club, province or national 
union cannot move during the term of their contract unless the player, his or her 
existing employer and the proposed employer all consent.
121 This means a player's 
contract cannot be transferred without the consent of the player as if the player were 
the property of his employer. Compensation in this situation is a matter of agreement 
between the parties. The NZRFU transfer regulations do not comply with this IRB 
Regulation. The NZRFU regulations specify bands of compensation whereas the IRB 
Regulation requires this to be agreed by agreement. As the NZRFU regulations were 
imposed by the NZRFU on the players the level of compensation payable has not 
been agreed by the relevant parties as required by the IRB Regulations. This could be 
rectified by revoking the current NZRFU regulations and replacing them with a player 
movement system agreed in the collective contract which the NZRFU could 
implement after agreement by regulation. 
Professional players off contract with their previous employer intending to 
move internationally and non-professional players who sign a professional contract 
with a club, province or national union for the first time outside their home union are 
subject to the IRB' s regulations providing for compensation for training and 
development. These regulations are designed to compensate the union or club losing 
the players services for the cost of developing the player. The amount of any 
compensation payable diminishes after the 'formative development' of the player 
121 !RB Regulation 4.7 I 
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each year the player stays with a union or club as a developed player. This mitigates 
against large or even any "transfer" fees for long serving players. A dispute about the 
compensation payable cannot delay the transfer of the player which must take 
place. 122This moderate level of restraint is an attempt to minimise the possibility of 
challenge either under the doctrine against restraints of trade or under the freedom of 
movement of workers provisions of the European Treaty. There is still restraint on the 
players freedom to work caused by the fact that a fee is payable and even though a 
player may move if there is a dispute the receiving club will not lightly take the risk 
of extra and uncertain cost. This however is likely to be mitigated by the relatively 
small sums likely to be involved in most cases. 123 The approach taken by the High 
Court in Rugby Union Players Association v Commerce Commission (No2/ 24 and the 
acceptance by the European Court of Justice in Bosman of the validity of the concept 
of compensating clubs for the real cost of the development of players suggests the 
IRB's regulation would be held to be a reasonable restraint by both English and New 
Zealand courts. The fact that this has been accepted by the NZRFU as the 
international standard does leave it with a difficult hurdle to overcome if it is forced to 
have to convince a New Zealand court that the domestic regulation is reasonable.
125 
IRB Regulation 4.9 also contains an element of possible restraint of trade in 
that no potential employer can approach a player who is contracted without the prior 
written consent of the current employing union. The justification for the rule is to 
prevent disruption to the player's performance and to keep good relations between 
122 !RB Regulation 4.7.6 Regulation 4.7.5 provides that if within 28 days of clearance there is a dispute 
about the quantum of any fee the matter shall be referred to the !RB CEO who in tum shall refer it to 
the !RB judicial process. Unfortunately there is no time limit on the !RB's consideration of the matter. 
123 To date the NZRFU has been unable to justify payments of much more than NZ$10,000 under the 
/~B's Regulations. 
125 See later disc ussion of New Zealand regulation 
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unions. The English rugby union has amended this regulation domestically to allow 
approaches (without notice) in the last six months of a players contractual term. 
(d) IRB Regulations on appearances, communications, advertising and 
sponsorship 
IRB Regulation 7.1 and 7.2 provide: 
"7.1 A Person may not, without the prior written consent of his Union or 
Association (such consent to be at the discretion of the Union or 
Association), receive directly or indirectly any Material Benefit for 
appearing in, assisting with or communicating any advertisement, 
endorsement or promotion of any product, service or item which by virtue 
of content and/or presentation relates or refers wholly or partly to the 
Game, which relation or reference shall include, without limitation, the 
wearing, use or appearance with any rugby clothing, rugby artic les or 
rugby related equipment of any nature whatsoever. For the purposes of 
this Regulation, Person shall mean a Player, trainer, referee, touch judge, 
coach, selector, medical officer who is currently involved in the Game, or 
in the organisation, administration or promotion of the Game. 
7.2 The rights of a Person under this Regulation may be further limited or 
restricted by any agreement, understanding or contractual obligations 
between him and his Union, Association, Rugby Body or Club." 
This regulation would on its face be a considerable restraint on player's ability 
to trade on their image rights. It is largely ignored by the major rugby unions that as 
members of the IRB Council passed it. 126 Certainly the New Zealand players' 
collective agreement limits the unions' rights to use the player's image and the 
126 The NZRFU, Australian Rugby Union and Rugby Football Union (England) have all recognised the 
players ownership of their own image. 
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player's right to use NZRFU, Super 12 or NPC or provincial union imagery.
127 The 
Collective Agreements do not further limit the players rights they broaden them in 
clear breach of IRB Regulation 7.2. 
In light of the fact that many of the major unions have ignored the regulation it 
is unlikely that any player will have reason to challenge this Regulation. If the IRB 
seek to invoke the regulation they can reasonably expect to be unable to justify it. It is 
difficult to understand what the objective of the regulation is other than to attempt to 
control every commercial aspect of the game. If it is to somehow control activity that 
might bring the game into disrepute the IRB has a wide power in this regard in its 
disciplinary regulations. 
(e) IRB Regulations on Eligibility to play for national representative teams 
Eligibility to play for the international teams of the larger unions 1s of 
considerable economic value for players. Playing for the developing unions is less 
economically attractive other than as a means of attracting a European club or a Super 
12 contract. Once selected the players from developing nations face the dilemma of 
giving up income and insurance at the sub international for the glory and not much 
else of representing their nation. Eligibility requirements can be a significant restraint 
on the ability of players maximise their income. In New Zealand the Collective 
Agreement provides a minimum wage for an All Black player of $85,000 in addition 
127 Section 8 Collective Contract "Property Rights" where the agreement starts from the proposition 
that the rugby unions own their intellectual property and the players own their own identity. The 
employee is entitled to use the own identity for personal promotions but cannot use the employers 
imagery without consent. There are detailed processes and protections in Section 7 of the contract 
detailing the terms on which players can conduct personal promotions and what the reasonable grounds 
are for the employer to refuse consent. 
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to the minimum Super 12/NPC payment of $65,000. The All Blacks will play a 
maximum of eight matches in a season while Super 12 and NPC involve up to twenty 
three matches in a season. 
IRB Regulation 8.1 provides: 
"8.1 Subject to Regulation 8.2, a Player may only play for the senior fifteen-aside 
National Representative Team, the next senior fifteen-a- side National 
Representative Team and the senior National Representative Sevens 
Team of the Union of the country in which: 
a) he was born; or 
b) one parent or grandparent was born; or 
c) he has completed thirty six consecutive months of Residence 
immediately preceding the time of playing." 
IRB Regulation 8.2 implements a "one country" rule which prevents players who 
have played for the senior national team, the national "A" team or the national sevens 
team from playing for another country. 128 This regulation was not deemed necessary 
until l January 2000. It appears to be a heavy handed over reaction to the 
"grannygate" affair where Scotland and Wales fielded players that were not eligible 
under the grandparent rule. Given the IRB 's contemporaneous desire for rugby union 
to be an Olympic sport the more considered reaction may have been to adopt the 
Olympic eligibility requirements . 
128 The lRB' s rationale for these regulations is that players in these teams should have "a genuine, 
close, credible and established national link with the country of the Union for which they have been 
selected Such a national link is essential lo maintain the unique characteristics and culture of elite 
international sporting competition between Unions. The integrity of International Matches between 
Unions depends upon strict adherence to the eligibility criteria set out in the Regulations." The problem 
with the justification is that the criteria specifies place of birth, ancestry or residence not nationality. 
Under thi s criteria for example the author has a genuine close, credible and established national link 
with New Zealand by birth and Wales and Ireland by ancestry. 
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Rugby union aspires to be an Olympic Games sport. To be eligible to participate in 
the Olympic Games rugby player will have to be a national of the country of the 
National Olympic Committee (NOC) which is entering him. 
Rule 46 of the Olympic Charter provides that if a player is a national of two or 
more countries he may elect to represent one of them. Once a player has represented a 
country and has changed his nationality he cannot represent his new country for three 
years since he last represented his previous country. The three year period can be 
reduced by agreement between the IOC, NOC and the IRB. The IOC's regulations 
seem to be a legitimate response to the desire to protect the national character of a 
national team. In the context of freedom of movement of workers the criteria based 
around nationality have been accepted to be an essential and reasonable part of the 
creation of national teams and international competitions between national teams. 
They are not acceptable in relation to teams and competitions below national 
teams. 129The IRB is under pressure from a number of fronts to amend its eligibility 
requirements. Given its Olympic aspirations it would be appropriate to adopt the IOC 
standard with allowances for determining the nationality of the Irish, Welsh, Scottish 
and English players. 130 
129 Walrave and Koch v Association Union Cycliste fntemationale [ 1974] ECR 1405; Dona v Mantero 
[ 1976] ;Lehtonen v Federation Royale Beige des Societies de Basketball [2000] ECR 1-2681; and 
Deutscher Ha11dballb11nd eV v Maros Kolpak [2003] Case C-438/00 ECJ Celex Lexis May 8 2003 
130 Note that the United Kingdom and Ireland are the only two countries that could represent the four 
home unions at the Olympic Games. 
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As it stands the IRB eligibility requirements are some way away from being 
nationality based and the further they are away the harder they are to justify as a 
reasonable restraint of trade. 131 
(f) IRB Regulations on player availability for international rugby 
IRB Regulation 9 gained some notoriety during the 2003 Rugby World Cup 
when some nations complained that they were not able to get players released to play 
in their national teams because they preferred or were being forced to play in the 
English premiership or the New Zealand NPC. 
The regulation provides that national unions have first and last call on players 
required to play international rugby; 132 that no national or provincial union or club can 
in any way prevent the release of a player to a national union for national team duty
133 
or impose payment or other conditions on the player's release.
134 If a player is 
unwilling or unable to play the regulation states the player will be unable to play 
rugby for the period while the national team plays and ten days thereafter. National 
unions are required to "rigorously enforce" the regulation and the employing club or 
union cannot insist on the player being insured by the national union. 
135There is no 
obligation to continue to pay the player while on international duty. Accordingly from 
131 The eligibility regulations may also breach relevant human rights, freedom of movement and anti 
discrimination law. The authors view is that the regulations are in breach of New Zealand's anti -
discrimination laws. 
132 IRB Regulation 9.1 
133 lRB Re;ulation 9.2 
134 IRB Re;ulation 9.3 
135 Guideli;e I to !RB Regulation 9 
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the players perspective the regulation either forces him to make himself available to 
an international union that is not obliged to pay him or insure him against injury or 
renders him liable to sanction by being banned from playing for his employer club or 
union for a period ten days longer than the period he would have been assembled with 
the national team. 
This regulation is a clear restraint of trade, a likely breach of the freedom of 
movement of workers provision of the European Treaty and a breach of the Article 4 
of the European Convention which prohibits the performance of forced and 
compulsory labour. It is impossible to see how any court would accept as reasonable a 
situation where a player who refused to work for another employer ,is master the right 
word, who would not necessarily pay him or insure him against injury and subsequent 
loss of income would be subject to sanction by his employer. 
(g) IRB Regulation on Broadcasting Rights 
Having defined what broadcasting rights are IRB Regulation 13 goes on to provide: 
"13.2 No Rugby Body, Club or Person or any combination thereof may negotiate or enter into 
or benefit from any contract for the grant of any Broadcasting Rights in respect of any Match 
or Matches except with the express written consent of the Union within whose territorial 
jurisdiction such Match is or Matches are to be played, such consent to be in the absolute 
di scretion of the Union. 
13.3 No Rugby Body, Club (or Person with knowledge of such breach) may take part in any 
Match to which Broadcasting Rights have been granted in breach of the provisions of 
Regulation 13.2." 
The regulation prohibits even the negotiation of broadcasting rights by players or 
anyone else without the consent of the relevant national union. This is one of the new 
regulations that the English clubs complained of being in flagrant breach of European 
competition law . The justification of the regulation is unclear other than to avoid 
clashes between matches. If that is its purpose it can be achieved by much narrower 
regulation of the type used in UEFA's broadcasting regulations which were approved 
by the European Commission after confining themselves to very narrow windows 
around actual matches. 136 The fact that the Commission has approved the rules does 
not mean someone will not take the restraint of trade point but it does prove there is a 
basis on which amended regulations might be justified. It can also be achieved by 
reasonable match scheduling regulations . 
The fact that this regulation came into force after 1996 suggests a commercial 
rather than a sporting motivation. As it stands the regulation stops players or their 
union from negotiating broadcasting rights for a match they may wish to organise 
without the permission of the relevant national union . It also stops players playing in a 
match organised by a third party where that match was organised without the 
permission of the national union . It would be legitimate if the only purpose of this 
regulation were to ensure the laws of the game were properly enforced and the 
disciplinary rules applied but again that could be covered by a much more specific 
regulation. 
(h) IRB Regulations on the scheduling of matches 
136 European Commission Decision of 109 April 200 1, Case 37.576 UEFA Broadcasting Regulations 
OJ Ll71 
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IRB Regulation 16 requires IRB Council consent before international matches 
can take place. The consent cannot be unreasonably withheld. The justification of the 
regulation is twofold - to stop unions like England from organising a schedule of 
matches so they played the SANZAR nations more often than Scotland, Ireland or 
Wales and to promote development of the game by mandating tests of major nations 
against developing nations such as Fiji and Samoa. Without meaningful revenue 
sharing, even of broadcasting revenues, the current schedule actually impoverishes the 
developing nations. The position of the major unions on revenue sharing is 
completely hypocritical because both the Six Nations and Tri Nations tournaments 
involve considerable revenue sharing. 
The regulation also gives either the IRB or the relevant national union 
complete control over all levels of rugby played within their national boundaries. In 
regard to the administration of the sports aspects of rugby union such regulation is 
sensible but if used to stop alternative competitions from being organised it is likely to 
be anti-competitive behaviour and it will limit the employment opportunities for 
players. 
C The South African, Australian and New Zealand Rugby Union 
unincorporated joint venture (SANZAR) 
SANZAR is an unincorporated joint venture of the three national rugby unions 
of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. 
Each of the SANZAR unions refuses to employ players for their national 
teams if the players are not playing in each union's respective national competition or 
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m the Super 12. They also have policies which restrict the employment of players 
who are not eligible to play in their national team.
137 
Such a policy would be unlawful within in Europe in regard to the European 
Cup as both a restraint on freedom of movement of workers and also as a restrictive 
practice under European competition law where there is no antitrust exemption for 
labour markets. There is also a question of the legality of the restriction in the free 
labour market that exists between New Zealand and Australia.
138 
There is no doubt, in the Australasian context the policy restrains the ability of 
a player to work where he would otherwise be able to work. The unions' justification 
of the policy would be based on their view that there was a need to control entry to the 
level of competition below their national teams in order to keep their national teams 
strong. They would have to distinguish the reasons why this is not the case for other 
similar codes such as rugby league and why there are different needs in Australasia to 
those in Europe. It is difficult to see how the policy would not be held to be an 
unreasonable restraint of trade if challenged. 
137 There is no formal agreement between the unions. Each has separately come to its own selection 
policy. South Africa does allow players from Zimbabwe, Namibia and Kenya to play Super 12 rugby. 
New Zealand does make exceptions for players from Pacific Island nations in the Super 12 and there is 
a special immigration status enabling these players to get work permits. Australia makes no 
exceptions. 
138 Whether the combination of CER and the agreement between New Zealand and Australia that 
citizens of either country can freely enter the other and work without a permit when combined with 
New Zealand and Australian anti-discrimination legislation creates a right of the freedom of movement 
of workers similar to the European right is beyond the scope of this paper. On the face of it New 
Zealand and Australian rugby union players should be free to play in rugby teams in each others 
countries in exactly the same ways that rugby league players can. There is certainly no statutory 
exemption of the kind found in the UK legislation that allows an exceptio for sport for the selection of 
national teams and limits on who may play in national competitions 
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D The New Zealand rugby pyramid 
1 The NZRFU 
. d . 139 . d d h The NZRFU 1s an incorporate society , incorporate un er t e 
Incorporated Societies Act 1908, and is the governing body for the sport of rugby 
union in New Zealand. 
The NZRFU's voting members are twenty seven provincial rugby unions who 
are all similarly incorporated and Whakapumautanga, also an incorporated society. 
All these members have voting rights with the number of votes of the provinces being 
determined by the number of teams in a province. The distribution of votes is not 
totally proportionate. Unions with smaller team numbers have disproportionably high 
voting rights. Whakapumautanga has two votes. 140 
The members of the provincial rugby unions are the rugby clubs and other 
rugby bodies within provincial boundaries of each provincial rugby union. The 
boundaries of each provincial rugby union have been set over time by the NZRFU. 
Some boundaries are more certain than others. In the past boundaries were more 
important as players were subject to zoning regulations that restricted who they could 
139 A copy of its constitution and annual accounts is available on line at the New Zealand companies 
office as are copies of the constitutions and financial accounts of the 27 provincial unions. 
Whakapumautanga and the five Super 12 franchises. 
140 There are also a number of Associate Members including the New Zealand Combined Services 
Sports Council, New Zealand Marist Rugby Federation, New Zealand Universities Rugby Football 
Council, New Zealand Schools Rugby Council and New Zealand Deaf Rugby Football Union. These 
members have no voting rights. 
64 
play for. These regulations no longer exist and a player can play club rugby wherever 
I 1 · h 141 t 1e p ayer w1s es. 
The NZRFU is the organiser of competitions and games at inter-provincial 
level and above. There are no separate league organisations such as Premier Rugby in 
the United Kingdom or National League in France. The NZRFU directly controls all 
domestic provincial representative professional rugby and organises international and 
Super 12 rugby in New Zealand. 
The NZRFU organises the national teams (All Blacks, Black Ferns, New 
Zealand Maori, Sevens and national age grade teams) . It is the national regulatory 
body for the game and recognised by the International Rugby Board as New 
Zealand's representative on the IRB. 
2 The NZRFU Constitution 
The NZRFU is directly linked to the IRB by its constitution. Rule 3.1.3 
provides that one of the objects of the NZRFU will be to represent the NZRFU on the 
IRB. Rule 3.1.4 of the NZRFU Constitution provides one of the NZRFU's objects is 
to: 
"Meet IRB Requirements: subject to domestic safety law variations adopted by the Union, 
comply with the Laws of the Game and the bye- laws, regulations and reso lutions of the !RB 
and to require members to si milarly comply." 
141 There are usually restrictions on where clubs can play contained in their constitutions and usually 
clubs can only play in competitions within the boundary of the union to which they are affiliated. 
Players on the other hand are free to travel to and play for clubs across provincial boundaries . 
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The NZRFU is empowered to carry out all or any of its objects.142 Acting 
outside the IRB's bye-laws, regulations and resolutions would be ultra vires the power 
of the NZRFU. As an incorporated society the NZRFU does not have the advantages 
of the wide powers accorded companies under New Zealand law. It is clear that the 
NZRFU is bound by the IRB Bye-laws and regulations and could not validly make a 
regulation at odds with an IRB bye-law or regulation . 
The NZRFU constitution binds the rest of New Zeal and into the pyramid by 
Rule 5.2. which provides: 
''Binding Each Member 
S 2 1 Is Itself Bound is bound by the Rules and Reg ulati ons, 
S 2 2 It Members are Bound must ensure that its members are bound 
by the Rules and Reg ul ati ons, and 
S 2 3 Its Members Members are Bound must require in its own rules 
that its me mbers ensure that the ir respective me mbers agree to be 
bound by the Rules and Regul ations, 
to the intent that all sub-uni ons and c lubs and a ll other bodies and 
persons connected wi th the playi ng or administrati on of rugby 
within New Zealand who are d irectly or indirectl y affil iated to any 
Member sha ll agree to be bound by these Regulations. 
Rule 5.3 of the NZRFU Constitution in re lation to members of the NZRFU but 
not the NZRFU itself143 provides: 
"Conflict of Rules: An y rule or regulati on of a member or othe r Rugby playing organi sation 
bound by thi s Constituti on which is in conflic t with this Constitution, or with the Laws of the 
Game or domestic variations or the bye- laws, regul ations and reso lutions of the IRB, sha ll be 
deemed to be inoperative." 
142 Rule 3.2.23 NZR FU Constitution. 
143 The NZRFU itse lf be in g captured by its objects c lause di sc ussed above 
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Members of the NZRFU who breach the NZRFU' s rules or regulations can be 
suspended or expelled from the NZRFU or fined by it.
144 
The NZRFU constitution prohibits a member union from sanctioning a match 
(other than a club match in an ordinary club competition, provincial or national 
representative match) involving a player resident outside the member union's 
boundaries without the written consent of the NZRFU board of directors.
145 
Clubs and players are prohibited from playing with players or clubs that have 
been suspended or expelled from rugby. 146 
3 NZRFU Regulations and Policies 
(a) NZRFU Regulations for eligibility for selection to Provincial Union NPC 
and Ranf urly Shield teams 
Eligibility to play for the lowest level of professional team an NPC team in 
New Zealand is governed by the NZRFU "Regulations for eligibility for selection to 
affiliated union senior representative teams for the National Provincial Championship 
and Ranfurly Shield"147These regulations were amended in 2002 to remove some 
restrictions on the number of players not eligible for New Zealand who could play in 
an NPC team for a province. The 2001 NZRFU regulation defined an "overseas 
player" as: 
"a player who: 
144 Rule 10 NZRFU Constitution 
145 Rule 31 3 NZRFU Constitution 
146 Rule 31 3 NZRFU Constitution 
147 available from the NZRFU. 
67 
a) does not hold a current New Zealand passport; and 
b) is not eligible for the All Blacks; and 
c) has not had his principal place of residence in New Zealand for the 
immediate past three consecutive years." 
The regulation then limited the number of such players that could play in the NPC. 
The 2002 decision of the NZRFU Board to remove the restrictions may have 
reflected a concern that players who were not eligible to play for the All Blacks 
(because they had chosen to play for another national side) but were in all other 
respects New Zealanders were being denied the opportunity to play professional 
rugby at NPC level. If this was the justification for the change it has ramifications for 
continuing justification of the All Black and Super 12 eligibility criteria which just as 
much deny New Zealanders the right to work and play for these teams. 148 
The existing NPC eligibility regulations 149 contain no limit on the eligibility of 
players who play their club rugby in a province before 1 May to play for that 
province. 150 If a player is registered with a club before I May he or she is eligible to 
play. If a player is not an overseas player and is returning to his or her previous 
province they can play provided they return before l June. The maximum number of 
players who can play who were not registered with the province who wants those 
players to represent them is set at six (up to two of which can be overseas players). 
An overseas player is now effectively simply someone who has not registered with a 
148 See later discussion 
149 Attached as Appendix A 
150 May I i up to two months after the club season will have commenced and three months before the 
NPC usually starts so the intent is obviously to create a connection with the province and a contribution 
to rugby within it before representing it. A three month connection is clearly felt to be long enough for 
anyone to represent a province. 
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club anywhere in New Zealand before l May. The definition has nothing to do with 
national origin as it did previously. 
In 2003, and for reasons that are not explained in the comprehensive document 
making the case for change, the NZRFU Board appears to have changed its mind 
· 151 15? aga111. The NZRFU has announced that: -
"(a) Players will be eligible for selection for Super 12 squads only if they have been part 
of a Premier or Modified Division I senior team squad during the most recent 
domestic season and have played a specified number of games. 
(b) The existing regulation allowing outside players to be eligible for inclusion in 
playing squads of senior representative teams will be repealed. 
(c) The existing regulations governing the transfer of players will be amended. New 
regulations governing the transfer of players to Premier I teams will be developed. 
These regulations recognise that player transfers will be an outcome of the processes 
being put in place to manage the Premier competition. 
(d) Overseas players wanting to play in the Premier Competition will need to apply to 
the NZRU. 
(e) Loan players and overseas players will not be eligible for inclusion in Modified 
Division I teams." 
A key issue from a restraint of trade perspective will be whether the NZRFU 
retains the current definition of overseas player or reverts to the more restrictive 200 l 
definition. On what basis is the NZRFU's decision to allow an "overseas player" to 
play or not play in the Premier competition going to be based? If it retains the current 
15 1 The NZRFU "Competitions Review " 24 November 2003 (available at http://www.allblacks.com last 
accessed 25 November 2003) 
152 above at 96-97 the reasons for the change in policy and the decision are not explained at all in the 
document. There is extensive comment on every other aspect of the section headed "Managing 
Competitions" but no justification of the change of mind or the reasons for the new policy. 
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definition it will for example be entirely possible for Australian players who do not 
need a work permit to enter New Zealand to play club rugby before 1 May in New 
Zealand and thus be eligible to play in the NPC. There will be no restraint on players 
who have chosen to play for countries other that New Zealand and who already play 
club rugby in New Zealand before 1 May. Players who enter New Zealand from the 
Pacific Islands on the special permits that allow them to play professional rugby will 
not be overseas players provided they play club rugby before 1 May. 
(b) NZRFU Regulations Relating to Transfer System 
These are the regulations that were subject to the successful authorisation of a 
restrictive practice by the New Zealand Commerce Commission 
153 which was 
challenged in Commerce Commission v Rugby Union Players Association 
(No2./ 54The issues surrounding whether or not these regulations constitute an 
unreasonable restraint of trade had been subject to comment.
155 There are only three 
things that can be added. 
The regulations have not achieved their stated objective of achieving 
competitive balance and that has been made clear in the NZRFU's recent review of its 
domestic competitions. 156The NZRFU has also favoured salary caps and revenue 
sharing as the means to achieve competitive balance and financial sustainability for 
153 Commerce Commission Decision 281 17 December 1996 
154 
[ 1997] 3 NZLR 30 I 
155 "Restraint of Trade and Antitrust: A Pigskin Review Post Super League" 6 Canterbury Law 
Review 1997; Shelly Duggan "The New Zealand Rugby Football Union Transfer Arrangements" 
Victoria University of Wellington LLM Research Paper 1997 
156 NZRFU "Competitions Review" November 24 2003 available at hllp://www.allblacks.com 
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the NPC and the teams that compete in it. If those were implemented the argument for 
the current transfer regulations would be weakened. 
Any suggestion, such as that made by the Commission, that an independent 
contractors market for players services exists should, given the coverage clause, not 
survive the Collective Contracts coming into force on l January 2002.
157 
Finally and perhaps most significantly the NZRFU Transfer Regulations 
where also justified on the basis of compensating unions or clubs for player 
development costs. This is exactly the same justification for the IRB Regulation 4.7 
yet the IRB process is a much more targeted measure where the actual development 
costs are calculated. The NZRFU would face some difficulty justifying its internal 
transfer systems inconsistency with the external transfer system applying 
internationally. The external system does not provide the NZRFU, provinces or clubs 
with anything near the money provided by the internal system. There simply is no 
justification for the different approaches. 
(c) NZRFU Policy on Super 12 team selection 
New Zealand Super 12 teams are selected under an NZRFU Board policy that 
players eligible to play for the All Blacks are to be selected first for any position. If 
such a player is not available then players eligible to play for the Pacific Island 
nations will be selected. The Super 12 coach has the discretion to decide on selection 
157 It is acknowledged that the Auckland Rugby Football Unions activities in apparently continuing to 
offer independent contractor contracts to its NPC players does not help thi s argument but it is 
submitted that an application by the players union to the Employment Court under section 6 (5) 
Employment Relations Act 2000 to declare whether the Auckland players are contractors or employees 
would soon settle that matter in favour of the players being employees. 
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up to this point. If the coach believes that no All Black or Pacific Island nation 
eligible player is suitable for the position and he has an alternative player eligible to 
play for another nation the decision on whether that player may be employed is a 
matter for the NZRFU Board. It is not clear what the NZRFU's recent Competition 
Review intends for the future. It may be the future policy is simply going to be if a 
player plays NPC he can play Super 12. If that is the case the issue will be the 
reasonableness of the new NPC policy . 158 
The current policy is on the face of it in breach of the Human Rights Act 1993 
and the Employment Relations Act 2000 neither of which contain a provision similar 
to the section 39 (b) of the equivalent United Kingdom Act in relation to participation 
in sporting competitions. It is doubtful that the New Zealand Parliament would be 
prepared to legislate an exemption as wide as the United Kingdom exemption in light 
of the Closer Economic Relations Agreement and the understanding between 
Australia and New Zealand on the freedom of movement of residents between the two 
countries. Also there are special immigration arrangements open to Pacific Island 
nationals to enter New Zealand to play professional sport that suggests the 
government would be unwilling to upset the Pacific Island nations either. Perhaps the 
best option for the NZRFU is to investigate whether the Australian legal position is 
similar and that therefore the Australian Rugby Union Super 12 selection policy is 
unlawful as well. 
(d) NZRFU policy on All Blacks eligibility 
158 The issue of unreasonable restraint of trade is discussed earlier in this paper under section relating to 
the SANZAR joint venture 
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The All Blacks selection process and eligibility for selection is determined by 
a combination of the IRB regulation on who is eligible to play for a national team and 
NZRFU Board policy. IRB Regulations 8.1 and 8.2 are outlined above. The NZRFU 
Board policy is that you must meet that criteria and be playing in New Zealand. To be 
playing in New Zealand you must by definition be employed by NZRPL.
159 
The first issue is whether, having agreed to comply with IRB Regulations and 
having obtained the agreement of the professional players to comply the NZRFU can 
adopt a more restrictive policy than the IRB in relation to eligibility for national 
teams. The short answer is yes. IRB Bye-law 4(b) allows a national union to adopt a 
more restrictive policy. 
The NZRFU would justify the policy on the basis that it needed to keep as 
many players as possible in the New Zealand domestic competitions as possible and 
this selection policy meant that players who wanted to play for the All Blacks had to 
stay and play in those competitions. The counter would be that if the NZRFU has 
decided to allow any overseas player registered with a club in New Zealand before 1 
May to play in the NPC its NPC policy is inconsistent with its national team selection 
policy. It is difficult to judge exactly how a court would view this policy but it is a 
policy that restrains the trade of players and the NZRFU needs to recognise that it will 
have to justify it if challenged. In doing so it will face the twin difficulties of 
159 Of the eight nations with the voting control of the !RB France, England, Scotland, Wales and 
Ireland will all select players from outside their own competitions or outside teams affiliated to them 
New Zealand, Australia and South Africa all adopt the you must play in our country policy. Other 
nations simply do not have a choice as most of their best players will have to play outside their 
jurisdiction to earn a living. The concern of the SANZAR unions is that if they do not restrict 
eligibility in this way many players will choose to play for the more lucrative clubs in Europe and 
Japan and the SANZAR Super 12 and domestic competitions will be diminished as a result. 
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explaining why New Zealand is different to the European nations that have no such 
restraints and why players of any nationality are free to play in the NPC. 160 
The current policy is on the face of it in breach of the Human Rights Act 1993 
and the Employment Relations Act 2000 neither of which contain a provision similar 
to the section 39 of the equivalent United Kingdom Act in relation to nationals. The 
absurdity of the situation in relation to "national team" selection is acknowledged but 
it nonetheless remains a fact that the New Zealand law at the moment precludes the 
selection of employees who play in national teams on the basis of national origin, 
which is the basis on which national teams are selected. lt would be a very useful 
amendment to the Employment Relations Act 2000 and the Human Rights Act 1993 if 
a provision similar to section 39 (a) of the United Kingdom Act where inserted into 
the New Zealand legislation. 
(e) Provincial Rugby Union and Rugby Club Constitutions 
Provincial rugby unions and clubs have generally altered their constitutions to 
comply with the requirements of NZRFU membership. 161 Professional players 
160 The justification of the exclusion or limitation of players not eligible for national teams in 
subsidiary competitions is based on the rugby idea that a strong national pyramid leads to a strong 
national team. This is not a model accepted by many other sports such as soccer or rugby league. The 
opinion is strongly held by unions such as New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Scotland, Wales and 
Ireland but faces a huge practical challenge in Europe in light of the ruling in the Kolpak case that hold 
such rules to be a breach of the freedom of movement of workers. If teams (other than national teams) 
in Europe can be filled with citizens of countries of almost any region except Asia, Australasia or the 
Americas what is the objective and is the regulation the most proportionate way to achieve that end 
161 The Wellington Rugby Football Union constitution provides that the WRU is bound by the rules 
and bye laws of the NZRFU ( WRU Rule 2 5 ); that it has the power to suspend cluu members, officials 
and spectators found guilty of a breach of any NZRFU laws(WRU Rule 10 ?);the rules of Clubs must 
provide that every member of the club shall be deemed to have subscribed to the NZRFU constitution 
and rules and laws of the game and the WRU constitution and rules(WRU Rule 13. l);Schools are 
similarly captured by WRU rule 14 2. At the club level the level of constitutional compliance with the 
dictated of the governing bodies is patchy. For example while the Poneke Football Club was one of the 
WRU members that signed the authorisation of the current WRU rules Poneke's own rules do not bind 
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playing for those unions are already bound to comply with the IRB and NZRFU rules 
and regulations in the collective. 
(f) Participation Agreements between the NZRFU and the Provincial Unions 
Participation agreements are the final part of the rugby pyramid. As 
part of the "big bang" which occurred in 1996 it was necessary for the NZRFU and its 
member unions to document the relationship between the NZRFU and the provincial 
unions in relation to the competitions and matches that were captured by the 
agreement the NZRFU, along with its SANZAR partners, had signed with News. 
These competitions and matches included international, Super 12, NPC and Ranfurly 
Shield matches. 
The participation agreement is prefaced on the understanding that the NZRFU 
controls and is the organiser of all of the professional competitions played in New 
Zealand and owns all commercial rights to them. 162The NZRFU agreed to allocate 
internationals, Super 12 and NPC matches to provincial unions, allow them to 
participate in the competitions and provide them funding in consideration of them 
entering into the participation agreement. The agreements are for a ten-year term.
163 
Poneke or its members to comply in the manner envisaged by those rules. In the case of professional 
players the point is not important because the unions they play for are bound by their constitutions and 
by the participation agreement with the NZRFU to comply with NZRFU and lRB rules and regulations. 
162 There seems to have been no doubt about the NZRFU's ownership of the competition and the ri ghts 
or perhaps no desire by the provincial unions to take the point. There has been considerable debate in 
Europe over who owns the commercial rights that has in most cases been held to be the club on whose 
ground the game is played. The provincial unions did reserve the right to enter broadcasting 
arrangements for matches outside those contracted to News which suggests the provinces were not 
giving up on the idea that they might own the rights but rather accepting the News arrangement was the 
best deal open for them. The NZRFU's consent is required but cannot be unreasonably withheld. But 
note thi s is at odds with the !RB regulation, which suggests consent could be unreasonably withheld. 
163 For commentary on what happened in England and Wales see Lewis and Taylor above 
A3.20;3.29;3.30;3.3 l ;3.70;3.74;3. l l 7;3. l l 8;3. l 38;3.153;3.156;3.166;3. l 68;3. l 75;3. l 79;3.223;3.224;8 
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The provincial unions agreed to remain affiliated to the NZRFU, to abide by 
its rules and regulations and by the rules, regulations and bye-laws of the IRB. 164The 
IRB requirement that the affiliated membership of the NZRFU is similarly bound to 
the IRB as the NZRFU is bound is thereby achieved. 
The provincial umons also agreed to supply teams to the competitions they 
qualified for. There is an acknowledgement that the NZRFU would determine which 
teams played in the Super 12 and that the provinces would help ensure the Super 12 
was a success. 
In 2001 the agreements were amended by the addition of mutual obligations 
relating to the collective employment contract165 and the funding and accounting 
requirements of the agreements about generally accepted rugby accounting practice 
and annual NZRFU and provincial union performance agreements. Otherwise the 
agreements remained unchanged. 
(g) The New Zealand Super 12 franchise structure 
The structure and existence of the New Zealand Super 12 teams are a result of 
the decision by the NZRFU not to allow direct entry of New Zealand provincial union 
teams into the Super 12 competition. The Super 12 had been conceived as an 
2.119. It may be possible for someone to attack these agreements as an unreasonable restraint of trade 
because of their length or because they are anti-competitive. That issue is beyond the scope of thi s 
paper but those interested should see News Limited v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd ( 1996) 139 
ALR l 93;News Limited & Ors v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Limited & Ors 
(2000) 177 ALR 611 (appealed to High Court of Australia decision reserved); News Limited v South 
Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd (the South Sydney case) Unreported decision of the 
High Court of Australia [2003] HCA 45 S34/2002 delivered l3 August 2003 Kirby J 
16~ See comment above about the NZRFU constitutional requirement that complements the contractual 
rirovisions of the participation agreements. 
65 The relevant clauses of the participation agreements and related agreements are set out in full in 
Waikato Rugby Union (Inc) v New Zealand Rugby Football Union ( Inc) Unreported Employment Court 
decision (WC46/02; WRC 37/02) Wellington 12 November 2002; 10 December 2002 Judge CM Shaw 
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international provincial championship played between existing provincial and state 
teams from the SANZAR nations . The NZRFU could have simply allowed the top 
five finishers from NPC in 1995 to represent New Zealand in 1996, and allowed that 
selection process to continue into the future, but instead chose to establish five Super 
12 franchises. There is no need to go into the rugby pros and cons of that decision in 
this paper. All that it is necessary to understand is that the Super 12 structure despite 
the use of terms like franchises is very much part of the traditional rugby pyramid. 
The franchises are groups of provinces grouped into franchise companies with 
directors appointed by the provinces and by the NZRFU. A provincial union 
appointed by the Board of the franchise company manages each Super 12 franchise. 
The key point from a player's perspective is that the NZRFU retains ultimate 
control over all the intellectual property associated with the Super 12 team, it can 
change the location of a franchise and NZRPL is the only employer of Super 12 
players. In addition the NZRFU with its SANZAR partners controls all aspects of the 
competition itself. The New Zealand Super 12 structure has strengthened the control 
of rugby in New Zealand by the NZRFU relative to the provinces that are its 
members. In this sense the powers of the NZRFU are stronger166 that those found in 
England or France where the professional leagues are run by the clubs themselves or 
by companies owned by a combination of leagues and national unions. 
166 The situation in Australia is similar to the New Zealand si tuation although the Super 12 s ides are 
based on the three Australian State unions who directly contract players but are paid an equal amount 
by the ARU to do so. 
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VI CONCLUSIONS 
The extent of the control of professional rugby union by rugby union's 
governing bodies in all countries in which it is played requires professional players to 
organise collectively not only domestically but internationally . 
The nature and extent of the control by the national unions that control the 
IRB means that freedom of professional rugby players to work is significantly 
restrained. The players could attack many of the rules and regulations as unreasonable 
restraints of trade and breaches of human rights legislation. 
It is in the interests of the national unions to work at international and national 
levels with players unions because it diminishes the possibility of parties who may not 
have the interests of the whole game at heart from entering the sport. 
The principles and processes underlying the Employment Relations Act 2000 
provide a very good model for rugby union administrators and players unions to 
follow. Teamwork, respect for each other and for the opposition is at the heart of the 
rugby union and it will be all the more commercially valuable if all involved 
remember that in everything they do. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
REGULATIONS FOR ELIGIBILITY FOR SELECTION TO AFFILIATED 
UNION SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE TEAMS FOR THE NATIONAL 
PROVINCIAL CHAMPIONSHIP AND RANFURLY SHIELD 
l. Subject to the Regulations Relating to Transfer System and Regulations 5, 7, 10 
and 11 of these Regulations the team playing squad, consisting of the fifteen 
selected players plus seven reserves ("team playing squad"), for the senior 
representative team of any Affiliated Union for the National Provincial 
Competition and the Ranfurly Shield shall consist only of players who: 
a) are registered with a club competing in a club competition conducted under 
the control and jurisdiction of that Affiliated Union ; and 
b) have not: 
(i) except as provided for under Regulation 3 of these Regulations, at or after 
I May of the current calendar year been registered with a club competing 
in a club competition conducted under the control and jurisdiction of 
another Affiliated Union; or 
(ii) except as provided for under Regulation 2 of these Regulations, at or after 
l May of the current calendar year been registered as a member of a club 
or other Rugby organisation in an overseas country. 
2. In the case of a player returning to New Zealand after playing rugby in an 
overseas country as a member of a club or other Rugby organisation in that 
overseas country and who: 
(i) was in the immediately preceding calendar year, registered with a club 
playing in the club competition of the Affiliated Union he wishes to 
represent in the National Provincial Championship; or 
(ii) was the subject of registered transfer to that Affiliated Union under the 
Regulations relating to Transfer System during the immediately preceding 
transfer period (as defined in the Regulations relating to Transfer System); 
and 
(iii)was not classified as an Overseas Player for the purposes of the National 
Provincial Championship in the immediately preceding calendar year; then 
the date referred to in Regulation l b) ii) of these Regulations shall be l June. 
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3. A player registered with a club competing in a club competition under the joint 
control and jurisdiction of two or more Affiliated Unions shall be eligible for the 
team playing squad for the senior representative team of the Affiliated Union 
within whose boundaries the club the player is registered with is located. 
4. Any player transferring his club registration from a club ("initial club") located 
within the boundaries and under control and jurisdiction of one Affiliated Union 
to a club ("new club") located within the boundaries and under the control and 
jurisdiction of another Affiliated Union ("new Affiliated Union") shall not be 
eligible to play for the new club or the team playing squad for the senior 
representative team of the new Affiliated Union until the player produces a 
clearance from the initial club. Such clearances must not be arbitrarily withheld by 
the initial club. 
OUTSIDE PLAYERS 
5. Subject to Regulation 9 of these Regulations the team playing squad for the senior 
representative team of an Affiliated Union for a National Provincial 
Championship round robin competition or Ranfurly Shield match may include up 
to six players who do not satisfy the requirements of Regulation a) and b) (i) of 
these Regulations (each an "Outside Player") provided that: 
a) the outside player has not been selected as a member of the team player squad 
for the Senior Representative team of another affiliated union in the current 
National Provincial Championship round robin competition except where, for 
the 2002 season, the outside player has played for an Affiliated union in the 
place of an All Black absent on Tri Nations duty and has become superfluous 
to that Affiliated unions requirement on the return of the All Blacks. 
b) where the Outside Player has been registered with a club competing in a club 
competition conducted under the control and jurisdiction of another Affiliated 
Union, the Affiliated Union has obtained the prior written consent of that other 
Affiliated Union. Such consent must be unconditional except that the 
Affiliated Union granting the consent may require the Outside Player to return 
if he will be selected in the team playing squad for its senior representative 
team's next match as a result of an injury to another player; 
c) the Outside Player has not been the subject of a registered transfer under the 
Regulations Relating to Transfer System during the Transfer Period (as 
defined in the Regulations Relating to Transfer System) immediately 
preceding the current calendar year; and 
d) subject to Regulation 6, the Outside Player becomes a member of the team 
playing squad for the senior representative team of the Affiliated Union before 
the conclusion of the that team's fourth game of the current National 
Provincial Championship round robin competition ("Cut-off-Date"). 
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6. An Outside Player injured after the Cut-off-Date may be replaced by 
another Outside Player, provided such replacement player has not been a 
member of the team playing squad for the senior representative team of another 
Affiliated Union in the current National Provincial Championship round robin 
competition. 
OVERSEAS PLAYERS 
7. Subject to Regulation 9 of these Regulations, the team playing squad for the 
senior representative team of an Affiliated Union for a National Provincial 
Championship round robin competition or Ranfurly Shield match may 
include up to two players who do not satisfy the requirements of Regulation 1 
b) (ii) of these Regulations (each an "Overseas Player") provided that: 
a) the Overseas Player has complied with the IRB Regulations Relating to Player 
Status, Player Contracts and Player Movement and is validly registered with a 
club competing in a club competition conducted under the control and 
jurisdiction of that Affiliated Union ; 
b) the Overseas Player has not been selected as a member of the team playing 
squad for the senior representative team of another Affiliated Union in the 
current National Provincial Championship round robin competition; and 
c) the Overseas Player becomes a member of the team playing squad for the 
senior representative team of the Affiliated Union by the Cut-off-Date. 
8. No Overseas Player who is injured may be replaced by another Overseas Player 
after the Cut-off Date for that Affiliated Union's team. 
9. The combined number of Outside Players and Overseas Players in the team 
playing squad for the senior representative team of an Affiliated Union for any one 
match must not exceed six. 
TRANSITION PROVISION 
10. Players who were the subject of a registered transfer under the Regulations 
Relating to Transfer System during the 200 l Transfer Period (as defined in the 
Regulations Relating to Transfer System) or who fell within one of the Transfer 
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Bands (recorded in Schedule l of the Regulations Relating to Transfer System) 
wi II not be required to meet the requirements of Regulation l (a) and (b) of these 
Regulations in 2002. 
PLAYERS RETURNING FROM OVERSEAS 
11. Subject to Regulation 12 of these Regulations, when a player returns to New 
Zealand after playing Rugby in an overseas country as a member of a club or 
other Rugby organisation in that overseas country, then he is not eligible to 
represent an Affiliated Union as a member of the team playing squad for that 
Affiliated Union's senior representative team in the National Provincial 
Championship or the Ranfurly Shield until he has been registered with a club 
which competes in the club competition conducted under the control and 
jurisdiction of that Affiliated Union for a period of not less than three weeks after 
arriving back in New Zealand. 
12. The three week registration period in Regulation 11 of these Regulations will not 
apply where a player returns to New Zealand after playing Rugby in an overseas 
country as a member of a club or other Rugby organisation in that overseas 
country to the club with which he was last registered before leaving New Zealand. 
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